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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
RELIABLE AND SECURE DRONE-ASSISTED MILLIMETERWAVE
COMMUNICATIONS
by
Mai Abdel-Malek
Florida International University, 2021
Miami, Florida
Professor Ahmed S. Ibrahim, Co-Major Professor
Professor Kemal Akkaya, Co-Major Professor
The next generation of mobile networks and wireless communication, including the fifth-generation (5G) and beyond, will provide a high data rate as one
of its fundamental requirements. Providing high data rates can be accomplished
through communication over high-frequency bands such as the Millimeter-Wave
(mmWave) one. However, mmWave communication experiences short-range communication, which impacts the overall network connectivity. Improving network
connectivity can be accomplished through deploying Unmanned Ariel Vehicles
(UAVs), commonly known as drones, which serve as aerial small-cell base stations.
Moreover, drone deployment is of special interest in recovering network connectivity in the aftermath of disasters. Despite the potential advantages, drone-assisted
networks can be more vulnerable to security attacks, given their limited capabilities. This security vulnerability is especially true in the aftermath of a disaster
where security measures could be at their lowest.
This thesis focuses on drone-assisted mmWave communication networks with
their potential to provide reliable communication in terms of higher network connectivity measures, higher total network data rate, and lower end-to-end delay.
Equally important, this thesis focuses on proposing and developing security measures needed for drone-assisted networks’ secure operation. More specifically, we
aim to employ a swarm of drones to have more connected, reliable, and secure
communication over the mmWave band. Finally, we target both the cellular 5G
network and Ad hoc IEEE 802.11ad/ay in typical network deployments as well
as in post-disaster circumstances.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Motivation

The Next Generation of Mobile Networks (NGMN), including the 5G system and
beyond, needs to satisfy the demand for high traffic data that may emanate from
the various Internet of Things (IoT) devices as well as mobile users Equipments
(UEs) that are increasingly demanding streaming applications [WGA+ 15].Given
the current wireless bandwidth crunch, [WM14,DP11], this is becoming a pressing
issue that needs to be addressed for the sustainability of the current services. One
promising solution is to tap into higher bands, such as MillimeterWave (mmWave).
Communication over the mmWave spectrum band can support such high data
rates due to its abundant bandwidth [WHQW14, GKZV08].
However, mmWave propagation suffers from a short communication range and
can be easily blocked [BDRQL11,RSM+ 13,WWS+ 17,RSP+ 14]. If used in a multihop wireless ad hoc network (i.e., IEEE 802.11ad/ay-based mesh network), such
short-range communication may result in weak connectivity. Therefore, if the
mmWave band is to be utilized effectively for increasing the data rate in such
environments, the first challenge to be addressed is to improve the connectivity
of the underlying wireless network. Flying Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
or drones, as commercially known, utilization in NGMN and ad hoc networks
can contribute to such connectivity problem if utilized wisely. Once connectivity
is improved, mmWave can become a more effective means to seek throughput
maximization at the upper layer of the protocol stack by potentially utilizing
multiple and/or parallel transmissions through the available alternative paths.
One of the most challenging circumstances in NGMN is post-disaster such as
hurricanes and earthquakes, where the communication and power infrastructures
could be damaged, disconnecting affected communities from the rest of the world.
Hence, restoring communication on those networks is vital for damage assessment
and to start the recovery process. Public safety agencies and local governments
are currently considering deploying drones to address the need for rapid postdisaster recovery. Drones will act as relays among people in affected areas as well
as with local authorities.
Nevertheless, drone deployment raises various security threats, which can go
unnoticed and thus underexplored by primarily focusing on the 5G’s and wireless
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networks’ performance aspects. Then, those under-explored security threats can
become relevant, particularly in the post-disaster scenarios. For instance, as
drones are commodity IoT devices, they can be easily obtained and deployed
to eavesdrop on the network maliciously. In a post-disaster circumstance, as
authorities and people’s primary focus will be to facilitate aid efforts, security
will not be a priority, as in regular communication networks. Authentication
is particularly challenging in drone-assisted mmWave communication, given the
short-range limitation of communication over the mmWave spectrum band. More
precisely, not all optimally-positioned drones will have a direct communication
link with the centralized authentication entity according to coverage or capacity
constraints. Instead, drones will be connected to each other through a multihop mesh network. Therefore, there is a need to have drone-based short-range
authentication mechanisms, which is one of our primary motivations.

1.2

Research Objective
GSM Networks

Control Center/ Backhaul

Base Station Failure
Compromised Drone
Malicious Drone

Fig. 1.1 System model of UAV-based mmWave network.
In this work, we aim to utilize a swarm of UAVs to have a more connected,
reliable, and secure communication over the next generation mmWave frequencies
for a higher data rate transmission. The targeted next-generation communication system is shown in Fig. 1.1. One of the main requirements for the next
generation communication is restoring and enhancing the network connectivity
to avoid isolated node scenarios and reduce networks congestion. To this end,
we incorporate positioning a swarm of UAVs to increase the network connectivity
and address the mmWave short communication range. Jointly, we consider the
UAVs’ interference management to avoid power loss due to communication over-
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lapping. Moreover, we consider optimizing the UAVs’ limited resources, such as
transmission power. Once connectivity is boosted, mmWave can become a more
effective means of seeking throughput maximization. We then aim to multiple
and/or parallel transmissions through the available alternative paths to enhance
reliability further.
Furthermore, UAVs’ utilization raises various security threats as maliciously
controlled drones in both the cellular 5G and ad hoc wireless networks. The malicious UAVs can collect information by acting in the middle (i.e., Man in The
Middle attack (MiTM)). Those security threats increase the need for authentication and security mechanisms that can adequately eliminate suspicious UAVs.
Hence, one of our research aims is to secure UAVs communication within the next
generation mmWave communication. Therefore, we propose a fast, efficient, and
lightweight distributed authentication mechanism for drones.

1.3

Research Approach

Our research approach through this dissertation proposal is described in the following subsections.

1.3.1

UAVs’ Positioning

First, regarding the first challenge of the UAV swarm positioning, we utilize Optimization Theory. We optimally position the UAVs by providing mathematical
processing considering the model limitations such as optimum power allocation.
This model is Graph Theoretical-based, which provides an efficient connectivity framework that models and analyzes the relationship between the network
nodes and links. Then, we further provide a Communication Theory interference
and Quality of Service (QoS) constraints to optimize the network coverage and
manage the interference between the nodes.

1.3.2

UAVs’ Routing & Reliability

Once we enhanced the network connectivity, we tackle the reliability problem
of mmWave communications by deploying additional UAVs and exploiting parallel multi-path transmissions through the help of these UAVs. Specifically, we
maximize the initial network connectivity under an E2E delay constraint and a
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maximum transmission power for the UAVs assuming IEEE 802.11ad-based connections. To this end, we propose ensuring End-to-End (E2E) delay through
multi-path routing can ensure network reliability by increasing the redundant
data through different routes. To cover the link reliability challenge, we consider a network layer mechanism to provide routing management. We then utilize
a node-disjoint routing protocol that utilizes the mmWave PHY layer information and supports parallel multi-path transmissions for improved E2E delay and
throughput performance.

1.3.3

UAVs’ Authentication in Ad hoc Networks

Then, to implicate the security challenges over the ad hoc UAV network assuming
potential imposters. We propose lightweight and fast authentication mechanisms
that take into account the physical limitations of mmWave communication. We
first consider an IEEE 802.11ad/ay post-disaster recovery of destroyed communication infrastructure, where drones are temporarily positioned within the affected
area to create a wireless mesh network among public safety personnel. We opt
for a delegation authentication called a proxy signature, where the proxy signer
signs a message using a secret key of the original signer [DSP06, LY05]. Proxy
signature provides data security and user privacy while not increasing computational loads. We propose a drone-to-drone authentication mechanism based on
proxy signatures from the Control Center (CC).

1.3.4

UAVs’ Authentication to The 5G Core

Then, toward a secure drone communication under the 5G network, we further propose a more robust authentication mechanism inspired by the idea of
second-factor authentication in IT systems. Specifically, once the primary 5G authentication is executed, a slice specific is tasked to trigger a second-factor authentication utilizing different factors from the primary one. This trigger mechanism
operates the re-authentication procedure as specified in the 3GPP 5G standards
for easy integration.

1.3.5

Drone to Drone Authentication

We further propose a lightweight, fast, and reliable authentication mechanism
compatible with the 5G Device-to-Device (D2D) Proximity-based Services (ProSe)

4

standard mechanisms. Specifically, we propose a distributed authentication with
a delegation-based scheme instead of the repeated access to the 5G core network
Key Management Functions (KMF). Hence, a legitimate drone is authorized
by the core network via offering a proxy signature to authenticate itself to other
drones as a leader drone and vice versa.

1.4

Dissertation Contribution

Our contributions in this dissertation can be summarized as follows:
1. Formulating a novel UAV-based Integrated Access and Backhaul (IAB) positioning problem, in which we aim to maximize the backhaul network connectivity while providing the desired SINR for all users in the access network.
• Mathematically relaxing the formulated optimization problem to be an
Semi-Definite Programming (SDP) one that can be solved numerically
with reasonable complexity.
• The proposed algorithm finds the best positions for the considered
UAVs to enhance the backhaul network’s algebraic connectivity. In
the meantime, we are achieving the desired SINR for all the users on
the mmWave access network.
2. We propose an analytical solution for the UAV-based network topology formation constrained optimization problem, where the minimum number of
UAVs, along with their locations and transmission powers, are identified.
This optimization is constrained to limit the acceptable E2E delay, and
hence, increase the network throughput.
• We model the expected delay between a source and destination using
a queuing analysis;
• We propose a multi-hop multi-path source routing scheme involving
UAVs that will also allow parallel transmissions at the network layer
for increased reliability, and hence, throughput.
• We incorporate the PHY/MAC layers implementation of the IEEE
802.11ay protocol into the NS-3 simulator for developing a routing
protocol with mmWave communication links and show that the developed analytical model closely matches the implementation results
under NS-3.
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3. We propose a proxy-based scheme for drone-to-drone and drones-to-ground
authentication in ad hoc IEEE802.11ad/ay post-disaster circumstances.
• We delegate one of the drones to sign the authentication warrant to authenticate other drones on behalf of a CC to reduce the communication
time energy.
• We propose a broadcast-based group authentication scheme for a drone
to its associated ground nodes, where a proxy signature challengeresponse authentication is followed.
4. We propose a second-factor authentication scheme to verify legal drones’
and other IoT devices’ authenticity as a part of the 5G network.
• We propose a challenge-response based protocol that conforms with the
current 5G authentication standard that utilizes drones’ digital IDs.
• We propose an authentication triggering mechanism based on the 5G
re-authentication mechanism.
• We implemented the proposed approach within the NS-3 simulation
environment, which supports 5G radio access.
5. We propose a drones’ D2D authentication in such a way that conjunct into
the 5G D2D ProSe standards.
• We add a delegation phase, after the mandatory 5G registration phase,
in which we assign a delegation warrant and proxy parameters.
• We propose a proxy signature authentication mechanism integrated
into the ProSe discovery phase.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. First, the related research
works’ literature review is in Chapter 2. Then, the background of the concepts
utilized through the dissertation is in Chapter 3. The UAVs’ positioning for
enhancing the network connectivity is discussed in Chapter 4. Next, the UAVs’
optimization challenge toward a reliable mmWave network is detailed in Chapter
5. Chapter 6 discuss the drone authentication in IEEE802.11ad/ay in a postdisaster circumstances. Then, The drones and IoT devices authentication to
the core network and other swarm drones in a mmWave-based 5G network are
in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, respectively. Finally, the concluding remarks and
future work are in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, we examine the related work of the studies presented in this
dissertation.

2.1

MmWave

The mmWave propagation suffers from a short communication range and can be
easily blocked [BDRQL11, RSM+ 13, RSP+ 14]. If used in a multi-hop wireless ad
hoc network (i.e., IEEE 802.11ad-based mesh network), such short-range communication may weaken connectivity or even lead to a disconnected wireless network
defeating the purpose of supporting high data rates [WHQW14, GKZV08]. The
mmWave communication has recently received significant attention in terms of its
channel measurements, modeling, and system design. For example, in [WWS+ 17],
the authors built an indoor communicating system to test and measure the
mmWave 60 GHz propagation patterns. The authors introduced a statistical
model for indoor multipath propagation. The ergodic capacity of an outdoor clustered mmWave network with directional antennas is proposed in [TH16], which
utilizes the directional beamforming and uncoordinated channel access to provide
cluster capacity gains.
There are ongoing researches on utilizing UAVs as relays to restore network
functionality in mmWave communication. That requires a rapid temporary routing algorithm toward sustainable connection to retain the communication [XXX16a].
For example, in [KYW+ 17] an autonomous mobile relay scheme was proposed to
extend the mmWave communication coverage. In [KOG17], UAVs are placed
to explore ray-tracing simulations and assess Doppler effects for air to ground
mmWave UAV communications. Similarly, the authors in [XXX16b] explored
the blockage and Doppler effect depending on UAV positioning under mmWave
spatial-division multiple access communication. In this work, we aim to optimally identify the minimum number of UAVs and their locations to maximize the
mmWave network connectivity.
The 5G mmWave has many considered potential bands, such as 28 GHz, 38
GHz, and 60 GHz, including several channel modeling measurements. The most
recent official 5G mmWave standard is adopting the 28 GHz. In [LMK+ 18],
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the authors model the 5G mmWave cellular channel at 28 GHz using NYUSIM
software [WoP18].
Moreover, the efforts are ongoing towards standardizing the mmWave communication with the development of new IEEE802.11 protocols such as 802.11ad
[NCF+ 14]. For instance, IEEE802.ad is an extension to the IEEE 802.11-2012
specification that adds a new MAC/PHY to provide short-range, high capacity
links in the 60 GHz unlicensed band [DGH14] for an ad hoc network of directional,
short-range, point-to-point links. The limitations on the IEEE 802.11ad are regarding the transmission range, which is within 10 − 20m. However, this problem was solved in IEEE 802.11ay using Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO)
technology to obtain up to 300m.

2.2

Drones as Relays

Many techniques have been developed to promote the selection of the UAVs’ positions towards network supporting and enhancing the network [RIG16, ARCP16].
Furthermore, the UAVs’ positioning model plays a crucial role in evolving network performance [MV17, LKC+ 16, DYLS15]. In [PJSL17], the authors proposed
an adaptive route recovery algorithm based on topology discovery and network
hole replacement with UAV relays, where network hole occurs due to the terrestrial network broke links that lead to isolated sub-networks.
There have been recent works focusing on 3-dimensional (3D) UAV positioning to serve multiple purposes, either to increase the connectivity of the backhaul
network [DYLS15, DCN07, Yan12], or to increase the coverage of the served UEs
[RW12, MSBD16, KSYY17, MSBD15]. First, we start with exploring works on
optimizing the UAVs positions only to enhance the coverage. In [ARCP16], the
authors derived a closed-form expression for the UAV position to maximize the
coverage radius in the presence of the Rician fading model. Optimal UAV positioning schemes to enhance the outage probability or Signal-to-Interference and
Noise Ratio (SINR) were discussed in [RW12] and [MSBD16], respectively. In
terms of achieving specific user data rates, a 3D positioning of UAVs’ are investigated in [MSBD15], with users having different rate requirements for urban
networks. Furthermore, the utilization of a UAV in D2D communication was
considered in [KSYY17], in which the UAV acts as a flying base station for users
in a D2D communication network.
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Second, we explore works on UAV positioning for network connectivity enhancement. For example, steering UAV for offshore network recovery and rare
territories with poor network construction was considered in [DYLS15] to improve the network connectivity. Utilizing the UAV to enhance the connectivity
was also proposed in [DCN07]. The authors derived the probability of an arbitrary
node being isolated as a representation of the network connectivity. In [Yan12],
coverage-based and connectivity-based mobility models were introduced toward
a UAV network monitoring. A comparison between both models is conducted to
clarify the tradeoff between achievable area coverage for the connectivity-based
model and achievable connectivity for the coverage-based model. As opposed to
these approaches, our UAV deployment is geared for maximizing reliability for
mmWave communication while also minimizing the E2E delay. In this work, the
optimization problem also considers the E2E delay and UAV power consumption
in addition to the UAV positioning.

2.3

Network Routing

Increasing network connectivity provides more routing options and enhances the
communication experience with good utilization. Multiple works are focusing on
UAVs’ routing for reliable UAVs’ networking. In [CCC+ 17], the authors developed
a mathematical programming model for a time-dependent UAV heterogeneous
fleet routing problem. A dynamic vehicle routing for UAVs performing spatially
distributed tasks in dynamic environments is proposed in [FEPS15a]. For an
energy-efficient routing, authors in [BHH19] proposed a UAV route determination
algorithm by modifying a Voronoi diagram reflecting sensor energy information
for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). In [FEPS15b], the authors proposed a
control policy to minimize the expected waiting time between the appearance of
randomly-generated targets and the time the UAV visits them in both light and
heavy loads. A novel and adaptive 3D UAV routing based on graph-theoretic
complexity reduction are proposed in [RXE+ 18]. Finally, in [RS06], the authors
proposed two approximated algorithms for a lower and upper bounding UAV
routing.
Moreover, relying on single-path routing cannot handle the link congestion or
failure, especially in ad hoc networks [HR08, WZSD00, CDS98, CRS99]. Hence,
the need to have multipath routes increases with the use of mmWave frequencies;
due to its short-range and high sustainability for link failure as aforementioned.
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Multipath routing has been studied in different contexts for the traditional wireless frequencies either to enhance the link reliability or to obtain higher data
rates [ND99, MD01]. More recent works are considering on-demand multipath
routing in ad hoc networks to reduce routing overheads, which have more effectiveness and efficiency [MD06]. With all the advantages of multipath routing,
when several paths share common resources, joint nodes, or links, performance
may even degrade than single-path routing. Hence, when a link or a node is mutual among several paths, severe flow congestion occurs with high incoming traffic
load. As a result, the shared node or link becomes a bottleneck [HF08]. Consequently, more recent research on multipath routing proposed node-disjoint path
routing protocols to avoid interference among paths [LG01,LC04a,LC04b,HF08].
In [RDBL12], the authors summarize the related work on multipath routing for
wireless networks for both the theoretical and practical sides of multipath routing. However, our work is different in terms of the impact on the lossy mmWave
network. Moreover, our optimization problem formulation for the UAV positioning considers both the E2E delay and the UAV power consumption while finding
suitable multipaths for proper communication.

2.4

Ad hoc Wireless Network Security

Security and privacy in wireless networks is a major concern, where the open nature of the wireless medium makes the wireless transmission vulnerable to eavesdropping and inimical attacks [WEDH14]. One approach to address wireless
network security is physical layer security, where the characteristics of the wireless channel are exploited to transmit confidential messages [AEAH12, YE11].
The attacks related to wireless networks are such as TELecommunication NETwork (TELNET)/File Transfer Protocol (FTP) attack, Denial-of-service (DoS),
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing [HTZ+ 16], ad hoc network [KLX+ 02]
and MiTM attack [GP15]. Hence, mutual authentication between the UAVs and
the network nodes is required to assure communication security [CP08,BWB+ 11,
WCMF17].
A survey of security requirements, attacks, and network integration in wireless
mesh networks is discussed in [RK08]. An introduction to wireless mesh networks
and present both the benefits enabled by this technology and the main hurdles
that have to be overcome is introduced in [Sic05]. In [NL09], the authors proposed
a heterogeneous wireless network integration model that integrates and clarifies
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the security reference points at the network boundaries. The authors in [DCNR09]
identified security goals and design challenges in achieving security for network
coding systems. The authors revealed that both intra-flow and inter-flow network
coding systems are vulnerable to a wide range of attacks at various stages of the
protocol. In [NNS+ 07] the authors investigated the key challenges at each layer
and discussed the feasibility of some proposed approaches in the literature to
address these challenges.
In [DW11], the authors proposed using public networks for remote sensingbased UAV security operations. Several works attempted to develop practical
and effective solutions for drone authentication in wireless networks. For instance, in [YLL+ 18], the authors propose a lightweight authentication scheme
for the internet of drones deployment utilizing an efficient one-way cryptographic
hash function. Other authors employed the elliptic curve Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) for a legal drone digital identity proof as in [TJP+ 19]. In [LYK18],
the authors investigated the secrecy outage performance achieved for opportunistic UAV relaying. The authors in [SGBW16] proposed a UAV position-aware,
secure, and efficient mesh routing approach. This approach showed more attack
mitigation than the well-known, secure routing protocol ARAN and the standardized security mechanisms of IEEE 802.11s/i. In [KGTK20], the authors proposed
a blockchain-based cryptographic algorithm for a secure UAV network.

2.5

4G Vs. 5G Security Protocols

The authentication in the 4G network included a unified authentication framework, better UE identity protection, enhanced home-network control, and more
key separation in key derivation [Ins19]. The proposed authentication for the
5G core network is based on a service-based architecture (SBA), enhancing the
previous variant currently used in the 4G. The 5G network standardized the 5G
AKA protocols for this purpose [Kou19]. These protocols work with the new
structure of the 5G that includes the subscribers, the Serving Networks (SNs)
with nearby base stations, and Home Networkss (HNs) that correspond to the
subscribers’ carriers. The AKA protocols enable the subscribers and HNs to mutually authenticate each other and let the subscribers and SNs establish a session
key [BDH+ 18].
There are some recent studies on the authentication aspects of the 5G. For instance, Software-Defined Network (SDN) is utilized to enable efficient authentica-
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tion handover, and privacy protection in [DW15]. The authors proposed a simplified authentication handover by global management of the 5G Heterogeneous Networks (HetNets) by sharing user-dependent security context information among
related access points. Furthermore, in [NLS18], the authors proposed a secure
service-oriented authentication framework for IoT services in the 5G network
where a privacy-preserving slice selection mechanism is introduced to allow fog
nodes to select proper network slices. The work in [SK18] proposes a two-factor
authentication, but it is for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) integrated with the
5G. The authentication is done for the user accessing this WSN, which is different
from our work, exploring two-factor authentication within the 5G network itself.
As seen, two-factor authentication has not been considered at all for the 5G core
applications. Therefore, our work fills a significant gap to strengthen security to
the 5G systems, especially for drone IoT applications.

2.6
2.6.1

UAVs Authentication
Message Authentication

Since drones are vulnerable to several kinds of attacks, drone authentication is
studied within the context of message authentication and device authentication.
For message authentication, in [WDK+ 19], the authors propose a lightweight authentication and key agreement scheme for the internet of drones deployment
utilizing an efficient one-way cryptographic hash function. One message authentication solution is utilizing centralized techniques such as Mavlink protocol, which is a header-only protocol used to communicate with a ground control
station [NA14, ANBDF05, ZYYY10]. Centralized techniques allow offshore authentication, which relief the load on the limited resources UAVs. Nevertheless,
our goal in this work is not message authentication, as we aim to perform device
authentication.
The authors in [YMM13] proposed a time-efficient privacy authentication protocol for secure communications, which achieves lower message latency and higher
efficiency in terms of computational and communication resources. In [VHSV11],
the authors proposed a simple, lightweight message authentication protocol based
on Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) protocol for CAN bus.
In [WY17], the authors proposed a local identity-based scheme, named LIAP, as
an anonymous message authentication in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs).
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Another VANET message authentication mechanism was proposed in [WS11],
where an Expedite Message Authentication Protocol (EMAP) was proposed. The
authentication protocol in [WS11] expedites message authentication by replacing
the time-consuming in the Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) with a fast revocation checking process employing the HMAC function. The authors in [ACK+ 20]
proposed a two-stage mutual authentication protocol for SDN-based multi UAV
networks in surveillance areas.

2.6.2

Device Authentication

For device authentication, in [TJP+ 19], the authors proposed an ECC digital
certificate as the identity proof of the legal drone toward drone network identity authentication. Such an identity can easily be replaced or regenerated in a
post-disaster scenario. Moreover, a Machine Learning (ML) mechanism for authentication in autonomous IoT systems is studied in [KAL+ 19]. This assessment
is done for different ML algorithms by computing and reporting each algorithm’s
precision and recall rates. This approach will not work in a post-disaster scenario
since the training needs to be done in advance.
There have been multiple works for different proxy signature approaches for device authentication purposes [DSP06]. For example, a short certificate base proxy
signature is proposed in [VSKH19] with a low computational cost to overcome
the integrity attacks on vehicular networks. In [ZK03], a blind ID-based partial
delegation with warrant proxy signature is proposed, where ID-based proxy is
to provide the anonymity of users. Also, in [HMMW19], the authors proposed
a designated verified proxy blind signature scheme for drone network based on
ECC that provides efficient computation. The assumptions and architecture in
this work are different from our case and focus solely on computation calculations.
Nevertheless, the blind proxy signature is a proxy signature mechanism designed
to maintain user privacy, and hence, it only has the original signer signature and
not the delegated/proxy signer itself. A powerful device authentication proxy
signature should have information about the proxy signer along with the original
signer. In [LMYT18], the authors proposed a new scheme to mitigate partial
attacks not considered by the identity-based proxy signature. While our work
utilizes proxy signature concepts like these studies, its proposed protocols are
very different where the goal is to authenticate drones to an existing network.
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2.6.3

D2D Authentication

A survey on variant state-of-the-art solutions to tackle security and privacy challenges in D2D communication spanning across a variety of D2D prospects is provided in [HWD+ 17]. An overview of the benefits of intelligent D2D communication in the IoT ecosystem is presented in [BZ16], where the authors focused on the
routing state-of-the-art. Algorithms can achieve intelligent D2D communication
in the IoT. In [BSD+ 20], the authors proposed a new blockchain-based secure
framework for data management among a group of drones. In [SBSW17], the
authors proposed a Body Area Network Device-to-device Authentication using
Natural gAit (BANDANA). The BANDANA algorithm enables secure spontaneous pairing of devices worn on the same body. In [KHK+ 14], the authors
proposed propose new D2D authentication protocols with a secure initial key
establishment using ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption(CP-ABE). The
authors in [ADM19] proposed a lightweight elliptic-ElGamal-based authentication
scheme using PKI (FHEEP) in D2D communication. In [LZLS12], the authors
investigated the direct D2D communications between user equipments in the LTEadvanced cellular networks. A quick and safe handover authentication scheme to
D2D out-band controlled communication mobility situations in the 5G-WLAN
heterogeneous networks was presented in [KO18]. Most of those works aforementioned are general-purpose drone authentication for any network and do not apply
to our case of D2D communication in 5G.
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CHAPTER 3
PRELIMINARIES
This chapter gives a piece of background information related to the technologies
used throughout the dissertation.

3.1

MmWave Channel

We utilize the mmWave channel model for the UAVs’ communications links, where
both the path loss and the small scale fading models are considered. The mmWave
channel modeling was introduced in [SMR17] based on extensive real-world wideband propagation channel measurements in various outdoor urban environments.
The close-in free space reference distance (CI) path loss P L model with a 1
m reference distance and an extra attenuation term due to various atmospheric
conditions [SMR17]
P LCI (f, d)[dB] =F SP L(f, 1m)[dB] + 10αlog10(d)

(3.1)

+ AT [dB] + XσCI ,
where f denotes the carrier frequency in GHz, d is the 3-D separation distance, α
represents the path loss exponent(PLE). AT is the attenuation term induced by
the atmosphere, XσCI is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with a standard
deviation σ in dB, and F SP L(f, 1m) denotes the free space path loss in dB at a
separation distance of 1 m at frequency f .

3.2

Graph Theory
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Fig. 3.1 Undirected Graph.
In graph theory models a number of nodes can be modeled as an undirected
finite graph G(V, E) where V = {v1 , . . . , vM } is the vertices set of the M nodes
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and E = {e1 , . . . , eK } is the set of K edges, as shown in Fig. 3.1. For any edge l
connecting two vertices vi and vj ∈ V, the edge vector al ∈ RM is all zeros vector
except its ith and j th elements are al,i = 1 and al,j = −1, respectively. The graph
incidence matrix of A ∈ RM ×K is given by A , [a1 , . . . , aK ] and its the M × M
Laplacian matrix can be written as follows [ISL09a]
T

L = A diag(w)A =

K
X

wl al aTl ,

(3.2)

l=1

where w denotes the K × 1 weighting vector coefficients for the K edges and
is given by [w1 , w2 , · · · , wK ]T . The Laplacian matrix is a positive semi-definite
matrix, i.e., L  0, with the smallest eigenvalue denoted by λ1 (L) is equal to
zero [ISL09a]. We term λ2 (L) as the second smallest eigenvalue, also known
as Fiedler value, of the graph Laplacian matrix which represents its algebraic
connectivity. The smaller Fiedler value is, the less connected the network is, and
vice verse. It is worth mentioning that when λ2 (L) = 0, the graph is disconnected
in which at least one of its vertices is unreachable from any other vertices in the
graph.

3.3

5G Primary Authentication

The 5G authentication structure is a unified framework to support both 3GPP access and non-3GPP access networks such as Wi-Fi. The 5G authentication structure supports Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) that is also in use for
IEEE 802.11 (WiFi) standard. In this regard, the 5G EAP authentication protocol supports both EAP-Transport Layer Security (TLS) and EAP-AKA protocols,
where authentication process is executed between the UE (a client device) and the
Authentication Server Function (AUSF)/Unified Data Management (UDM) (i.e.,
HN) through the Security Anchor Function (SEAF)/Access & Mobility Management Function (AMF) (i.e., SN) as an EAP authenticator [Ins19].
As 5G-AKA is widely used, we provide more info about its details, which is
also shown in Fig. 3.2: 5G-AKA structure allows the SEAF function to trigger
the authentication process once receiving any accessing message from a UE. In
this message, the UE has to send its 5G Global Unique Temporary Identifier
(5G-GUTI) temporary identifier to initiate the authentication procedure. If the
UE is not provided with a 5G-GUTI, a Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI)
can be used. The SUCI is an encrypted version of the Subscription Permanent
Identifier (SUPI) provided to each UE using the public key of the home network
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(i.e., it is encrypted using this key). Note that the SUPI should never be sent in
plaintext to ensure UE’s privacy.
Once SEAF receives the message, the authentication process is initiated by
the SEAF function, and an authentication request is sent to the AUSF function in
the home network. The AUSF then verifies that the serving network request is authorized. If it is a legitimate request, the AUSF proceeds with the authentication
procedure by sending an authentication request to UDM. Next, the Subscription
Identifier De-Concealing Function (SIDF) validates the SUCI by decrypting the
SUCI and obtains the corresponding SUPI and selects the authentication method
configured for the corresponding subscriber, which is 5G-AKA for our case. The
UDM then sends an authentication response to the AUSF including an AUTH
token, an XRES token, the key KAU SF , and the SUPI if not using the 5G-GUTI.
KAU SF is an important key material that can be further used to derive subsequent
keys for different purposes. We will rely on this key in our approach.

UE

Serving Network

Home Network

SEAF/AMF

USIM
1. N1 Message
(SUCI or 5G-GUTI)

UDM/ARPF/SIDF

AUSF

2. Auth Request
(SUCI or SUPI, SNid)

3. Auth Request
(SUCI or SUPI, SNid)
4. SUCI->SUPI, Select
5G-AKA, Generate AV

5. Auth Response
(AUTH, XRES, KAUSF,
[SUPI])
6. XRES->HXRES

8. Auth Request
(AUTH)

7. Auth Response
(AUTH, HXRES)

9. Check AUTH
10. Auth Response
(RES)
11. Check RES
12. Auth(RES)
Response
(RES)
13. Check RES,
KAUSF->KSEAF
14. Auth Response
(KSEAF , [SUPI])

15. Auth Success

Fig. 3.2 5G-AKA Procedure for authentication [Ins19].

3.4

5G ProSe Standard

4G and 5G Cellular networks allow UEs to establish independent D2D connections
for data exchange. For 4G and 5G networks the current D2D standard is 3GPP
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ProSe standards (TS 33.303) [Off20a] and (TR 23.752) [Off20b], respectively. The
ProSe is a D2D standard allowing LTE/5G devices to detect each other and to
communicate directly. The ProSe standard comprises the ProSe discovery and
the ProSe Direct Communication, which enables establish communication paths
between two or more ProSe-enabled UEs. The 5G (TR 23.752) ProSe [Off20b]
defines the following functions for D2D communication:
• 5G ProSe Direct Discovery: A procedure employed by a ProSe-enabled
UE to discover other ProSe-enabled UEs in its vicinity by using only the
capabilities of the two UEs with New Radio (NR) technology.
• 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay: A UE that provides functionality
to support connectivity to the network for Remote UEs. Based on our
network model, we focus on this case, where the leader drone represents the
UE-to-Network relay. However, our approach can also work for the Direct
Discovery mode.
The current 3GPP ProSe standards (TS 33.303) under the 4G ProSe [Off20a],
includes the ability to use a UE node as a UE-network relay as well as connection
establishment with it requires an in-advance key exchange process. The nodes
which will use ProSe services first needs to register with ProSe Function and
then make a Key Request to ProSe Key Management Function (PKMF), both
of which are unique units residing within the 4G core [Off20a]. PKMF will issue
a symmetric key with an ID (i.e., PKUK ID). Similarly, when a node acting as
UE-network relay is contacted by a remote UE, it will need to make another Key
Request to the PKMF for getting the same symmetric key corresponding to the
PKUK ID. Hence, both nodes will agree on the same symmetric key and can move
on to authenticate each other. Although the security mechanism for the ProSe is
well defined for 4G/LTE, there is still no finalized security standard for the 5G
standard yet [Off20b].

3.5

Proxy Signatures

We utilize Kim, Park and Won’s proxy signature scheme [LKK01], where a proxy
key pair depends on the signer private key for authentic information on the proxy
signer’s identity. Hence, in this model, the proxy signer’s identity is protected
using the node’s authentic key pair (xi , yi ). This is considered a strong proxy
signature since it represents both original signer’s in the form of a warrant wi
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and proxy signer’s signatures (i.e., the node’s private-public key pair (xi , yi )).
Once a proxy signer creates a valid proxy signature, no one can ever repudiate
his/her signature.
To further elaborate on this scheme, let the 5G core network (i.e., the original
signer) be node A and the under authentication drone (i.e., the proxy signer) be
node B. First, node A generates a random number KA from a g generator of multiplicative subgroup Zq∗ with order of large prime q, and hence, KA ∈ Zq∗ . Then,
node A computes two proxy parameters rA = g KA and sA = xA h(mw w, rA ) + KA ,
where xA is A’s private key, h() is a collision resistant hash function and mw is
A’s signed warrant. The tuple (rA , sA ) is A’s signature for mw , where (mw , rA , sA )
has to be sent secretly to node B. Next, once node B verifies the received tuple
?

h(mw w,rA )

as g sA =yA

rA , it then generates the proxy signature keys as follows:
xp = sA + h(mw , rA )xB

(3.3)

yp = (yA yB )h(mw ,rA ) rA
This means, Node B can authenticate itself to other nodes on behalf of the original
signer A using the proxy signature keys xp and yp .
Notation: Lower- and upper-case bold letters denote vectors and matrices,
respectively, also IM denotes the identity matrix of size M . The operations (·)T ,
E [·], and |·| denote the transpose, statistical expectation and absolute value,
respectively. The A  B denotes that B − A is a positive semi-definite matrix.
Finally, ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product operation.
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CHAPTER 4
UAV POSITIONING FOR OUT-OF-BAND INTEGRATED
ACCESS AND BACKHAUL MILLIMETER WAVE NETWORK

4.1

Introduction

This chapter aims to find the optimum locations for a set of UAVs operating in
the mmWave frequency band to achieve an efficient coverage-connectivity tradeoff
in an IAB mmWave network. On the one hand, the network connectivity is
characterized in terms of the algebraic connectivity (Fiedler value) [GY04, Sli13],
which is the second smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix representing the
backhaul network graph. On the other hand, the coverage is defined by the
threshold on the SINR. We consider an out-of-band (OOB) IAB network, in which
there is no interference between the access and backhaul networks, as they operate
on the different frequency bands. However, interference within the access network
is considered and mitigated by optimizing the UAVs’ locations. Given such system
and considerations, we formulate the UAV optimization problem as finding the
optimal UAVs’ locations that maximize the backhaul network connectivity while
maintaining the desired SINR above a certain threshold for all the served UEs.
Given the complexity of the formulated UAV-based OOB IAB problem, we relax it
through a number of steps to be prepared as a low-complexity SDP optimization
problem. Computer simulations are conducted, taking into consideration the
relevant mmWave frequency ranges and channel models. The proposed schemes’
results show higher connectivity measures (Fiedler value) while achieving the UEs’
desired SINR threshold. We point out that none of the previous works optimized
the UAV position to jointly extend the access network coverage and enhance the
backhaul network connectivity. To the best of our knowledge, this chapter is the
first to address the tradeoff between coverage and connectivity and improve such
tradeoff by utilizing and optimizing UAVs’ positioning.
Our contributions in this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• Formulating a novel UAV-based IAB positioning problem, in which we aim
to maximize the backhaul network connectivity while providing the desired
SINR for all users in the access network.
• Mathematically relaxing the formulated optimization problem to be an SDP
one that can be solved numerically with reasonable complexity.
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Fig. 4.1 System model of UAV-based integrated access and backhaul network.

• The proposed algorithm finds the best positions for the considered UAVs to
enhance the backhaul network’s algebraic connectivity. In the meantime,
we are achieving the desired SINR for all the users on the mmWave access
network.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows; first, the system model describing both the access and backhaul networks is described in Section 4.2. The
optimization problem is formulated in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 introduces the
problem relaxation and the proposed solution. Finally, numerical results are provided in Sections 4.5.

4.2

System Model

In this section, we describe the system model covering both the access and backhaul networks. Fig. 4.1 depicts an IAB network which generally consists of N
Small Cells (SCs) and M UEs. The N SCs are typically connected to each other
as well as to the core network. The closest SC serves the UEs; however, the UE
may lose the connection if they become out of the coverage range. In Fig. 4.1, we
show that a UAV can be deployed to serve two purposes. First, it can enhance the
backhaul network’s connectivity by relaying information among the SCs and core
network. Second, it can serve the UEs who are initially out of the SCs coverage.
We consider an OOB-IAB network, where the transmissions from the UAVs
to SCs and UEs are assumed to be frequency division multiplexed (FDM), i.e.,
UAV-to-SC and UAV-to-UE communication links occur over different carrier frequencies with no interference between these two tiers. In the next subsection, we
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introduce how to utilize graph theory in modeling the backhaul network while
modeling the access network using communication theory. The notations used
through this chapter are defined in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Notations.
Parameter

Definition

N

Number of SCs.

M

Number of UEs.

K

Total number of UAVs.

KJ

Number of UAVs assigned to serve both the UEs and SCs.

Pk,U E

Transmitted power from the k th UAV

hk,i

Channel coefficient channel between the k th UAV and the ith UE.

dk,i

Distance between the k th UAV and the ith UE.

α

Path loss exponent.

Ii

Interference for the ith UE.

Pj,U E

Transmitted power from the j th UAV to other users.

γ

UEs’ SINR matrix.

PI i

Interference power

σ2

Additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) variance

λ2 (L)
PU AV
RSC
RUAV
δ

4.2.1

Algebraic connectivity (Fiedler value) of a graph that
represents a network.
UAV maximum transmission power.
SCs transmission range.
UAVss transmission range.
Quantization step size.

Graph-theoretic Backhaul Network Modeling

The field of graph theory provides a good mathematical framework to analyze
the connectivity of the backhaul network. Therefore in this chapter, we consider
a graph-theoretic approach to model the backhaul network of small cells and
UAVs as follows. Fig. 4.2 depicts the modeling of the SC backhaul network
as an undirected weighted finite graph G(V, E) where V = {v1 , v2 , · · · , vN } is
the set of the SCs nodes and E = {e1 , e2 , · · · , eQ } is the set of all Q edges
(links) among the SCs. The undirected graph implies that all the links in the
network are bidirectional. Edges are defined based on the distance-based disk
model [MSBD16]. In the considered disk model, an edge exists between two
nodes if the distance between those nodes is less than RSC . We point out that
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Fig. 4.2 Backhaul network modeling.

the orthogonal transmission among the SCs and UAVs results in no interference,
and hence it is accurately represented by the distance-based model.
For an edge q, 1 ≤ q ≤ Q, connecting nodes vi , vj ∈ V , define the edge vector
aq ∈ RN ×1 , where the ith and j th elements are given by aq,i = 1 and aq,j = −1,
respectively, and the rest is zero. The relationship between the N vertices and
the corresponding Q links between those vertices in G is captured in a matrix
named the incidence matrix A ∈ RN ×Q , where the q th column is given by aq . For
this undirected graph, the Laplacian matrix L(A) ∈ RN ×N is defined as:
T

L(A) = A diag(w)A =

Q
X

wq aq aTq ,

(4.1)

q=1

where w denotes the q ×1 weighting vector coefficients for the q edges and is given
by [w1 , w2 , · · · , wq ]T and diag (w) is Q × Q diagonal matrix with the w as the
diagonal elements. The Laplacian matrix for such graph is positive semi-definite,
which is expressed as L(A) < 0 and also its smallest eigenvalue is zero, i.e.,
λ1 (L(A)) = 0. The second smallest eigenvalue of L(A), λ2 (L(A)), is the algebraic
connectivity, or Fiedler value, of the graph G [Fie73, GB06]. In this chapter, the
Fiedler value will be utilized to measure the backhaul network connectivity.

4.2.2

Interference-Based Access Network Modeling

This section introduces the downlink access network modeling, which consists of
small cells or UAVs on one side and UEs on the other side. Our goal is to model
the received SINR at UEs as the primary QoS metric for UEs. To calculate the
SINR, we assume a distance-based association model in which each UE will be
served by its closest serving station, which is either an SC or a UAV. Moreover, KJ
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UAVs are jointly assigned to serve the UEs and SCs. The remaining K −KJ UAVs
are only used to enhance the SCs connectivity. In addition to the conventional
association model, we also consider a load balancing scheme to have an equal
share of users assigned to each serving station. More precisely, the UAVs serving
the UEs are selected depending on their distance from each UAV, with an equal
UEs distribution for each UAV. The maximum number of UEs attached to each
UAV is equal to

M
.
KJ

Fig. 4.3 Interference-based access network modeling.

Along with the considered distance-based association model, we also consider
multiple interference sources. The interference-based model is shown in Fig. 4.3,
where the received signal at any UE is the desired signal from the assigned UAV
along with additional interfering signals. There are two different interference
sources, as shown in Fig. 4.3. One is the interference from the same UAV assigned
to the user while serving other trusted users. The second source of interference is
from other UAVs that are serving their assigned users.
The received signal at a given UE, i, which is associated with the k th UAV is
modeled as

yi =

p

−α/2

Pk,U E hk,i dk,i xk,i + Ii + ni ,

(4.2)

where Pk,U E is the transmitted power from the k th UAV. We assume equal power
distribution among all UEs assigned to the k th UAV. The hk,i is the channel
coefficient corresponding to the channel between the k th UAV and the ith UE.
Furthermore, xk,i represents the transmitted symbol from the k th UAV towards
its potentially-served ith UE with a unit power E{|xk,i |2 } = 1 and dk,i denotes
the distance between the k th UAV and the ith UE. ni denotes complex zero-mean
circularly-symmetric additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with variance σ 2 ,
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representing the noise at the ith UE, and it is assumed to be independent across
the UEs. Moreover, Ii represents the interference for the ith UE, where
M/KJ

Ii =

X

KJ
X
p
−α/2
Pk,U E hk,i dk,i xk,m +

M/KJ

X p
−α/2
Pj,U E hj,i dj,i xj,m ,

(4.3)

j=1,j6=k m=1

m=1,m6=i

where Pj,U E is the transmitted power from the j th UAV to other users.
As previously shown in Fig. 4.3, deploying multiple UAVs introduces two types
of interference. The first interference is due to the same UAV users, which is the
first part of Ii . The second type of interference is due to signals from other UAVs.
Then, the SINR of all the UEs is given by γ ∈ RM ×1 , where each element
represents the ith UE SINR and is given by
2
Pk,U E d−α
k,i |hk,i |
γi =
.
PI i + σ 2

(4.4)

where PIi is the interference power given as
M/KJ

PI i =

X

Pk,U E d−α
k,i

+

KJ
X

M/KJ

X

Pj,U E d−α
j,i .

(4.5)

j=1,j6=k m=1

m=1,m6=i

For an extensive network of multiple SCs and UAVs, we can assume that we
will have a large number of short terms representing the interference in Eq. (4.3).
Therefore, for simplicity of analysis and using the central limit theory, their addition can be represented by their average value. In other words, we can ignore the
small-scale channel coefficients in the interference term Eq. (4.3) while calculating
the interference power in Eq. (4.5). Therefore, the interference term in Eq. (4.3)
depends only on large scale fading.

4.3

Problem Formulation

In this section, we formulate the UAV-based IAB positioning problem. We aim
to maximize the backhaul network connectivity while providing the desired SINR
for all access network users. For the backhaul network with K UAV deployment,
a new graph G 0 is obtained with the same number of N nodes, a larger set of
edges denoted by E0 with Q0 edges where Q0 ≥ Q, i.e., E ⊆ E0 . As was shown
previously in Fig. 4.2, a given UAV can create a new edge between two SCs, if they
fall within its communication range, by relaying the information among them.
Then, the optimization problem of deploying K UAVs to increase the backhaul
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connectivity, while providing the desired SINR to the UEs, is formulated as
max
λ2 (L(E0 ))
0
E

s. t. γi ≥ γth , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N },

(4.6)

M Pk,U E + n Pk,SC ≤ PU AV , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , KJ },
(N − n) Pk,SC ≤ PU AV , ∀k ∈ {KJ + 1, . . . , K},
where Pk,SC is the transmission power from the k th UAV to a single SC and PU AV
is the UAV maximum transmission power, we assume all the UAVs have the same
maximum transmission power. Also, n is the number of SCs which the UAVs serve
jointly with UEs and (N − n) is the remaining SCs which are served separately
by the extra UAVs.
The objective function is to maximize the SCs backhaul connectivity represented by the algebraic connectivity (Fiedler value), introduced in Section 4.2.1.
Then, three constraints are considered: the first constraint is to provide a QoS to
the UEs by assuring a certain SINR level to each UE. The next two constraints
are to ensure that the maximum UAV power is not violated by either the SCs or
the UEs connections. We assume the UAV power is equally distributed between
the UAV-SC and UAV-UE connections. The total power allocated to the UAVUE links is equally distributed over all UEs assigned to the UAV. Similarly, the
total power allocated to the UAV-SC is equally allocated to all SCs. The total
UAV power, PU AV , is equally divided into two groups: UEs and the group of SCs.
Half of the UAV power,

PU AV
2

, is equally divided among the transmissions to all

the UEs associated with the UAV. The second half of the UAV power,

PU AV
2

, is

equally divided among the transmissions towards all the SCs connected with the
UAV.

4.4

Problem Relaxation and Proposed Solution

In the next section, we introduce the proposed approach to relax the optimization
problem under consideration and then present the proposed solution.

4.4.1

Problem Relaxation

Since each UAV can be deployed anywhere in the 3-D network, the location of
each UAV is considered as a continuous variable, which belongs to the interval
([0, h], [0, h], [0, h]). It has been shown that this problem is NP-hard in [HSSM05].
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To tackle this NP-hard problem [ISL09b], we convert the continuous optimization
problem into a discrete one by considering that the SCs and UEs are distributed
over h × h × h volume. Moreover, the search space over the x, y, and z axes
is uniformly quantized with a step size δ to get a search grid consisting of β
candidate positions for the UAV, which converts the continuous deploying to a
discrete search in a finite number of available positions on the grid.
Thus, the Laplacian matrix is represented by the following formula:
0

L(E ) = L(E) +

β
X

(4.7)

xj Aj diag(wj )ATj ,

j=1

where L(E) is the original graph before UAV deployment and xj = 1 if UAV is
positioned in the j th grid point, otherwise xj = 0. Moreover, wj and Aj are the
weighting coefficients vectors and the incidence matrix when the UAV is deployed
in this grid point. Collecting xj , j ∈ {1, . . . , β}, in the β × 1 vector x, Eqn. (4.7)
can be written as follows:
(4.8)

L(E0 (x)) = L(E) + (x ⊗ IM ) Γ,

where
Γ,

h

A1 diag(w1 )AT1

T

, . . . , Aβ diag(wβ )ATβ

T iT
.

(4.9)

Then the Backhaul connectivity enhancement problem can be formulated as
max λ2 (L(A(x)))
x

s. t. γi ≥ γth , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N },

(4.10)

M Pk,U E + n Pk,SC ≤ PU AV , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , KJ },
(N − n) Pk,SC ≤ PU AV , ∀k ∈ {KJ + 1, . . . , K},
where x ∈ {0, 1}.
Furthermore, we accumulate the SINR levels between the ith UE and the
associated UAV in a matrix V ∈ Rβ×M such that each column, vi , can be written
as

T
vi = γi |{dk,i ,dk,j }∈D1 , γi |{dk,i ,dk,j }∈D2 , . . . , γi |{dk,i ,dk,j }∈Dβ ,

(4.11)

where Di ∈ RM ×KJ , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , β} is the distance between each UE and each
UAV at only certain positions within the grid points only (1, 2, . . . , β). Hence, the
optimization problem can be written in terms of the UAV position index vector
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x as follows
max λ2 (L(A(x)))
x

s. t. xT V ≥ 1T γth ,
1T x ≤ K, x ∈ {0, 1},

(4.12)

M Pk,U E + n Pk,SC ≤ PU AV , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , KJ },
(N − n) Pk,SC ≤ PU AV , ∀k ∈ {KJ + 1, . . . , K},
We relax the constraint on the entries of x and allow them to take any value
in the interval [0, 1]. λ2 (L(A(x))) can be written as the point-wise infimum of a
family of linear functions of x as
λ2 (L(A(x))) = inf [y T L(A(x))y, k y k2 = 1, 1T y = 0].
y

(4.13)

Hence, it is a concave function in x. In addition, the relaxed constraints are linear
in x. Therefore, the optimization problem is a convex optimization problem with
linear constraints. Furthermore, the optimization problem in Eq.(4.6) can be
written as a Semi-definite Programming (SDP), which is a subcategory of the
convex optimization.
The relaxed SDP optimization problem can be written as follows [BV04]
P1 : max s
x,s

s. t. s(I −

1 T
11 )  L(A(x)),
β

xT V ≥ 1T γth ,

(4.14)

T

1 x ≤ K, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
M Pk,U E + n Pk,SC ≤ PU AV , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , KJ },
(N − n) Pk,SC ≤ PU AV , ∀k ∈ {KJ + 1, . . . , K}.

4.4.2

Proposed Solution

The relaxed SDP problem in Eq. (4.14) can be solved using an SDP solver such as
CVX SDPT3 solver [GBY08]. Afterward, and since the entries of output vector
x are continuous, we choose the maximum entry and set it to 1, while others are
set to zero.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the solution steps as follows; first, the total 3-D area
is quantized to the h × h × h cubes as mentioned in Section 4.2. Then, the new
network, including both the SCs and the UAVs, is defined using the incidence
matrix A(x) for all the permutations of possible positions (cubes) in the grid,
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Algorithm 1 K UAVs Positioning
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:

Input: (XSC , YSC , ZSC ) and (XU E , YU E , ZU E )
A ← the graph incidence Matrix
λ2 (L(A)) ← connectivity of SCs
Quantize:
β ← Grid positions
x ← β × 1 vector
P (β) ← permutation of all grid positions
for ∀k ≤ KJ &∀P (β) do
Link Matrix :
A(x) ← Link matrix after adding U AV s
L(x) ← Laplacian matrix after adding U AV s
Association ∀k ≤ KJ :
D ← Distance matrix after adding U AV s
γ(D) ← The UEs SINR
S(D) ← association matrix after adding U AV s
IS(D) ← Interference matrix
end for
for K do
Optimization:
maxx λ2 (L(A(x)))
if γ(D) ≥ γth & UAV total power ≤ PU AV then
Break
else
goto Optimization.
(XU AV , YU AV , ZU AV ) ← maxK (x).
end if
end for
Output: (XU AV , YU AV , ZU AV )

P (β). Next, we construct the distance matrix, D, of all possible locations for the
UAVs. Also, we construct the association matrix, S(D), to find the UEs assigned
to each UAV depending on the distance matrix and the maximum load assigned
to each UAV.
Next, the optimization solver is executed to find the maximum backhaul network connectivity while providing the desired SINR, γth , for all users in the access
network. The output optimized UAVs’ locations in the grid system is obtained
as a probability distribution of 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 due to the SDP relaxation. Hence, We
receive the UAVs’ locations by finding the maximum K values of x. Then, the
UAVs’ Cartesian locations are calculated by reversing the griding quantization
operation.
In terms of the complexity of the proposed algorithm, first, we point out that
the interior point algorithms for solving SDP optimization problems are shown
to be polynomial in time [FFK+ 00]. Therefore, the proposed UAV positioning
scheme, which applies a small number of iterations, requires solving the SDP
optimization problem and has a polynomial complexity in time.
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Finally, we point out that the proposed solution will be implemented via a
central node (e.g., core network) that has access to all the information in the
network, which is needed to solve the optimization problem in Eq. (4.14). The
central node will accordingly direct the UAVs to take their positions according to
the obtained solution.

Table 4.2 Simulation parameters.

4.5

Parameter

Value

h

100 m

N

10

M

2

K

1

RSC

40 m

RUAV

40 m

α

4

σ2

−130 dBm

PU AV

30 dBm

δ

6m

γth

30 dB

Simulation Results

This section presents simulation results to demonstrate the achievable performance of the proposed UAV-based IAB positioning algorithm. Our goal is to
show the performance improvement in the backhaul network connectivity while
providing the desired SINR for all access network users. For comparison purposes,
we also consider a random positioning approach, in which the UAVs are deployed
randomly while the SINR threshold constraints are satisfied for all the UEs. The
simulation is executed using MATLAB SDPT3 solver with the simulation parameters listed in Table 4.2. The results are averaged over 103 different backhaul
network realizations and UEs deployment locations. The 28 GHz mmWave channel coefficients are obtained through NYUSIM [SMR17], which is a developed
channel model simulator for the mmWave wireless communications.
Next, we present the results for the single UAV deployment in Section 4.5.1.
The multiple UAV simulation results are presented in Section 4.5.2.
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Fig. 4.4 UAV positioning for different γth . The square, cross and diamond markers
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4.5.1

Single UAV Simulation Results

This section shows the approximated SDP optimization solution in Eq. (4.14) to
find the optimal deployment of a single UAV deployment problem. We assume no
interference case, and hence, the SINR threshold is treated as only SNR threshold.
The impact of changing γth on the UAV positioning is shown in Fig. 4.4, where
the UAV position in the 3-D search grid with red diamond markers is plotted
for two extreme cases for the UEs constraints. In the first case, γth = 20 dB
corresponding to low QoS constraint. In this case, the UAV gets closer to the SCs
to enhance the backhaul network connectivity. The original network connectivity
is λ2 (L(x)) = 2.015 and the UAV deployment achieves λ2 (L(x)) = 6.476, which
is more than three times the original backhaul connectivity. In the other case
at γth = 60 dB, which represents a high QoS constraint, the UAV gets closer to
the UEs to satisfy their tight constraints with no improvement for the backhaul
network connectivity.
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Fig. 4.5 The connectivity of the SCs versus the UEs SNR constraint for β = 2197,
δ∼
= 8 m.

Quantization Step Size
Fig. 4.5 investigates the performance of the quantizing relaxation as compared to
the unquantized optimization problem in Eq. (4.6). It depicts the Fiedler value of
the SCs backhaul network graph as a function of the UEs SNR threshold γth . The
unquantized optimization is solved using the non-convex fmincon numerical solver
in MATLAB, with multi-initial point searching to avoid local minima situations.
Assuming δ = 8m in Eq. (4.14) for the quantized SDP optimization, Fig. 4.5 shows
that increasing the γth decreases the connectivity for the different schemes. It is
shown that the SDP-based quantized solution achieves nearly 35% gain compared
to the random positioning scheme, for γth = 30 dB. It is also shown the that
proposed SDP-algorithm achieves algebraic connectivity of 5.25, while the nonconvex solver achieves 6.5. Hence, there is a performance gap of 24% due to
relaxing the original non-convex optimization problem in this case.
To reduce the performance gap between the unquantized optimization and
the SDP-based solution, we decrease the step size to δ = 6 m, which results
in a higher quantization resolution. As shown in Fig. 4.6, the output from the
SDP optimization is the same as the unquantized optimization for all values of
γth . Furthermore, at SNR threshold γth = 30 dB and considering δ = 6 m, the
quantized SDP-based solution achieves a gain of 60%, compared to the random
positioning scheme. All the simulation results presented in the rest of this chapter
will be based on the quantization step of δ = 6 to avoid any performance gap due
to relaxing the original non-convex optimization problem.
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Fig. 4.6 The SCs connectivity versus the UEs SNR constraint for β = 3, 375,
δ∼
= 6 m.

Convergence of the Proposed SDP-based Algorithm
This subsection shows the convergence of the proposed solution, which is an
integral characteristic of any iterative solution. In implementing the proposed
solution, we have utilized the SDPT3 solver. Such solver produces its iterations’
status, once concluded, which can be “solved”, “Failed”, or “unbounded”. In an
attempt to characterize the convergence of the proposed iterative solution, we
show in Table 4.3 the ratio of the “solved” status, as opposed to the other ones,
for 500 different network deployment scenarios. As shown, 90% of the iterations
have resulted in a “solved” status leading to an optimum solution.
Table 4.3 Convergence analysis of the SDP algorithm.
SDPT3 status

Percentage

Solved

90%

Failed/Unbounded

10%

UAV Transmission Range
In this subsection, we investigate the effect of the UAV transmission range on
the backhaul connectivity. In Fig. 4.7 the algebraic connectivity of the SCs backhaul network is plotted against the UAV transmission range, RUAV . As shown,
the backhaul connectivity enhances with the increase of the UAV transmission
range. As the UAV transmission radius increases beyond a certain threshold, the
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Fig. 4.8 The Rayleigh fading channel versus the mmWave channel.

network algebraic connectivity saturates at its maximum possible value. Similar
to the above results, the proposed SDP-based solution outperforms the random
positioning scheme.
Millimeter Wave Channel Impact
In this subsection, we will investigate the mmWave channel’s impact on the SCs
backhaul network’s connectivity. The mmWave channel model at 28 Ghz is obtained through NYUSIM [SMR17]. Fig. 4.8 depicts the algebraic connectivity
considering both the Rayleigh and the mmWave channel fading channel and assuming α = 4. As a result of the higher-frequency of the mmWave signal, the
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Fig. 4.9 The connectivity of the SCs versus the UEs γth for K = 2 UAVs.

transmission range is smaller compared to the Rayleigh model. Accordingly, the
algebraic connectivity is less for the mmWave transmission.

4.5.2

Multiple UAV Simulation Results

This section provides the simulations results after solving Eq. (4.14) for multiple
UAVs. Our goal is to find the optimal locations for the multiple UAVs that
maximize the backhaul algebraic connectivity, subject to providing a certain SINR
threshold for all the UEs.
Fig. 4.9 aims to show the performance of the proposed algorithm in the multiple UAV case. We consider the deployment of K = 2 UAVs seeking to serve
M = 8 UEs. Fig. 4.9 shows that the proposed algorithm provides a better SCs
connectivity compared to the UAVs’ random positioning in both Rayleigh and
mmWave channels. Similar to the single-UAV case in Fig. 4.8, the mmWave
achieves lower connectivity than the Rayleigh fading. Compared to the random
positioning scheme, Fig. 4.9 shows that deploying 2 UAVs achieve a performance
gain of 100% for the Rayleigh channel and 80% for the mmWave channel, at an
SINR threshold of 20 dB. The achieved performance over the random positioning
is almost 60% for both mmWave and Rayleigh channels.
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Impact of Number of UAVs
In Fig. 4.10, the SCs connectivity is plotted against the UEs SINR threshold
for different number of UAVs, K = 1, 2, 4 textsand8, with the mmWave channel
model. In this scenario, the connectivity of the SCs network grows with increasing
the number of UAVs. For example, deploying K = 4 achieves a connectivity gain
of almost 3 times (200% gain) the original network connectivity at the SINR
threshold of 20 dB.
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Dependency on the Number of UEs
Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the number of UEs served by each UAV
by increasing the number of UEs,M , and keeping K fixed. In Fig. 4.11, the SCs
connectivity is plotted versus the UEs SINR threshold γth at K = 2 UAVs. In
this scenario, we notice a degradation in the algebraic connectivity as the number
of UEs increases, which can be clarified as follows, increasing the number of UEs
forces more UAVs to come closer to them to achieve the required UEs SINR.
Consequently, the UAVs move away from the SCs, which leads to lower algebraic
connectivity for the SCs backhaul network.
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CHAPTER 5
UAV-ASSISTED MULTI-PATH PARALLEL ROUTING FOR
MMWAVE-BASED WIRELESS NETWORKS

5.1

Introduction

This chapter investigates how the protocol stack’s upper layers can improve the
mmWave network throughput, particularly in an ad hoc network where streaming
might be needed in cases of emergencies or post-disaster scenarios. That not only
implies enhancing the reliability of mmWave communications (i.e., reduce packet
losses due to mmWave short range) but also modeling the data traffic to support
more traffic within a given period. Both purposes can be achieved by relying on
the deployment of additional relays in the network. The most suitable relays for
wireless ad hoc networks would be Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), as they
can be used on-demand for temporary purposes. That is particularly relevant for
emergency applications, military setups, or Intelligent Transportation Systems
(ITS) where additional connectivity is required [Bis00, BTM+ 06]. Therefore, we
study the optimization problem for UAVs’ deployment to improve network connectivity. Then, we find the most appropriate routes for data transmissions that
can also exploit parallel routing to boost throughput.
We consider a UAV-assisted ad hoc network with mmWave links, where we
aim to enhance the network connectivity by maximizing the algebraic connectivity
of the UAV-based network graph. Second, a constraint is added to limit the
acceptable E2E delay, and hence increase the network throughput. Jointly with
choosing the minimum number of UAVs and their optimal positions, we also aim
to define the UAVs transmission powers optimally. The problem of finding the
design aspects of the UAV-based topology, as explained above, can be formulated
as a complex constrained optimization problem. However, it can be relaxed to
a SDP optimization problem, which can be solved efficiently using one of the
available numerical SDP solvers.
Once the UAVs are optimally deployed, we propose forming multiple paths
among each source-destination pair to provide alternative data paths in case of
link failures. To this end, we propose a modified node-disjoint routing approach
to minimize potential interference among inter-routes, which will enable parallel
transmissions from the same source. In other words, we send the duplicate packets
through multiple paths simultaneously to increase the likelihood of successful
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reception at the receiver. To the best of our knowledge, the parallel transmission
idea has not been exploited before for mmWave communications.
For the performance evaluation of the proposed approach, we used two simulation platforms. The first platform is MATLAB, which is utilized to solve the
SDP optimization problem and find the deployed UAVs design parameters (3D
positions and transmission powers). The second platform is the NS-3 network
simulator, where we implement the IEEE 802.11ay mmWave communication protocol at 60 GHz, assuming an ad hoc network. Through the NS-3 simulations, we
were able to show a significant increase in the network throughput while reducing
the E2E delay when alternative or parallel paths are used for data transmission.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first work that utilizes parallel
routing for mmWave communications and incorporates this idea within the IEEE
802.11ad/ay standard. The limitations on the IEEE 802.11ad are regarding the
transmission range, which is within 10 − 20m. However, this problem was solved
in IEEE 802.11ay using MIMO technology to obtain up to 300m. Nevertheless,
since the IEEE 802.11ay implementation over NS-3 is not available to utilize yet,
we utilized the IEEE 802.11ad implementation [AW16], where we updated the
physical layer to have a MIMO transmission.
Based on the discussion aforementioned, the contributions of this chapter can
be summarized as follows
• We propose an analytical solution for the UAV-based network topology formation constrained optimization problem, where the minimum number of
UAVs, along with their locations and transmission powers, are identified;
For this goal, we model the expected delay between a source and destination using a queuing analysis;
• We propose a multi-hop multi-path source routing scheme involving UAVs,
that will also allow parallel transmissions at the network layer for increased
reliability, and hence, throughput;
• We incorporate the PHY/MAC layers implementation of the IEEE 802.11ay
protocol into the NS-3 simulator for developing a routing protocol with
mmWave communication links and show that the developed analytical model
closely matches the implementation results under NS-3.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The system model is described
in Section 4.2. The optimization problem and the routing model are described in
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Table 5.1 Notations.
Parameter

Definition

KV
N
s
r
n
SIN Rr
Rs,r
W
f
DE2E
(M/G/1,....)

Number of UAVs.
Number of nodes in the network.
Transmitter node.
Receiver node.
Path loss exponent.
Signal to interference-plus-noise ratio at the receiver.
Maximum rate between the transmitter and receiver.
MmWave transmission bandwidth.
MmWave transmission frequency.
End-to-End delay between the transmitter and receiver nodes.
Markov chain standard representation for the queue type.

λ2 (L)

Algebraic connectivity (Fiedler value) of a graph that
represents a network.
UAV maximum transmission power
E2E delay threshold.

PV
Dth

N2

N1

N3
N8

N7

N10

N4

r

N13

N5
s

N11
N6

N12

Fig. 5.1 System model.

Section 5.3. Then, the proposed solution and algorithms are described in Section
5.4. Finally, numerical results are provided in Section 5.5.

5.2

System Model

Fig. 5.1 depicts the assumed system model of an ad hoc wireless mesh network,
which consists of N nodes. A number of UAVs, KV , are deployed to increase network connectivity. Each wireless link is assumed to utilize the mmWave frequency
band at a frequency of 60 GHz. Before we detail the link model, delay model,
and network model used later in the computation of the number and locations of
the UAVs, we also briefly define the used notation in Table 5.1
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5.2.1

mmWave Channel Model

We consider a 60 GHz mmWave channel model for both the small scale and large
scale fading [SMR17], where the authors addressed the channel variation and
beamforming tracing for both line-of-sight (LoS) and non-line-of-sight (NLoS).
The fluctuation and beamforming model is then discussed in the channel coefficient representing the mmWave ray tracing. Then, the received baseband signal
from a source, s, at a destination, r, within a transmission radius R is as follows
N
X
p
p
−n/2
−n/2
yr = Pi,r hi,r di,r xs,r +
Pj,r hj,r dj,r xj,r + n0 ,

(5.1)

j=1,j6=i

where pi,r is the transmitted power from the last node in the path i to the destination node r and pj,r is the transmitted power from any other node j to the
destination node r which is considered as interference to node r. xs,r , xj,r are
the transmitted unit-power symbols from node s and j to node r, respectively,
and di,r , dj,r represent the distance between i and j nodes and r. Moreover, n0
denotes zero-mean circularly-symmetric additive-white-Gaussian noise (AWGN)
with variance σ02 and it is assumed to be independent across the nodes. Furthermore, hi,r and hj,r are the channel coefficient representing the small scale fading
corresponding to the channel between node i and r, or node j and r, respectively.
Finally, n is the path loss exponent.
The SINR at the input of the receiver is given by
SINRr = PN

Pi,r |hi,r |2 d−n
i,r

j=1,j6=i

2
Pj,r |hj,r |2 d−n
j,r + σ0

(5.2)

.

Following an information-theoretic model, the maximum rate for the communication between nodes r and s is computed as
Rs,r = W log2

1 + PN

Pi,r |hi,r |2 d−n
i,r

j=1,j6=i

2
Pj,r |hj,r |2 d−n
j,r + σ0

!
,

(5.3)

where W is the transmission bandwidth for the mmWave standard.

5.2.2

Delay Link Model

In this section, we model the expected delay for a packet between the source and
the destination which may include multiple intermediate hops. The E2E delay
can be written as [KR10],
DE2E = Dt + Dp + Dq ,
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(5.4)
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Fig. 5.2 Multi-path queuing model
where Dt , DP and Dq are the transmission delay, propagation delay and queuing
delay, respectively. Moreover, the transmission delay, Dt , represents the time
required to put an entire packet into the communication media and can be written
as,
Dt = N 0

m
min{i,j}∈s Ri,j

(5.5)

,

where, N 0 is the number of nodes in the route between the source and the destination nodes, m is the packet size and s is the set of nodes in the source and
destination route including the UAVs.
The propagation delay, Dp , is the time that takes a signal to propagate through
the communication media from one node to the next one and can be written as,
PN 0
Dp =

{i,j}∈s

kui − uj k2
c

,

(5.6)

where ui = [Xi , Yi , Zi ] and uj = [Xj , Yj , Zj ] are the ith and j th nodes 3×1 position
vector in the Cartesian coordinate system, respectively.
Furthermore, the queuing delay, Dq , is the waiting time for the packet spent in
a queue to be transmitted, which is usually obtained by performing queue model
analysis [BGH92]. This type of analysis includes an investigation of the status of
the arriving packet queue and the service/drain rate, as shown in Fig. 5.2.
After investigating the queue model at the source point, we considered a queue
of M/G/1 model. The queue has a Poisson distribution with λi arrival rate at
the ith node represented by the symbol ‘M ’ and a general service rate depending
on the mmWave channel between the source node and the next hop represented
by the symbol ‘G’. Moreover, towards our aim for a reliable mmWave network,
each packet from the source is transmitted on all the available multi-paths. In
other words, in the queuing model, we copy the queue output to all the available
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Fig. 5.3 Markov chain representation for M/G/1 and G/G/1
paths instead of splitting the queue for all the multi-path connections. Hence, our
model is M/G/1 and not M/G/M , where M is the number of available multipaths. The M/G/1 model is a Markov chain standard representation for the
queue type depending on the input and output rates, shown in Fig. 5.3.
Furthermore, all the nodes in the path except for the source node have a
G/G/1 queuing model as the arrival rate depends on the arrived packets through
the channel.
Then, the queuing delay at the source point is given by
Ws =

2
λi (σX
+ E{X}2 )
1
+ .
2(1 − ρ)
µi

(5.7)

2
where λi , E{X} and σX
are the arriving rate to the source node queue, the service

process expectation, and variance at node i which is the source node in this case,
respectively. Moreover, ρ = λi /µi is the service utilization, where µi is the service
rate of the queue and 0 ≤ ρ < 1.
The total delay at any node i (except the source node s) is as follows (see
Appendix I for more detailed explanation):
Wi =

σY2



dr,i
ds,i |ds,i − dr,i |

n

+ E{Y }d−n
s,i ,

(5.8)

where E{Y } and σY2 are the expectation and the variance of the queue service
process, respectively. Moreover, ds,i and dr,i are the distance between the source
s or the destination r and the ith node in the network, respectively. Hence, the
total queue delay on any path is:
0

Dq = min
M

N
X

!
Wi + Ws .

(5.9)

i=1

where M is the number of available paths.

5.2.3

Graph-theoretic Network Model

The baseline network can be modeled as an undirected finite graph G(V, E),
where V = {v1 , v2 , · · · , vN } is the set of the N nodes constructing the network
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Table 5.2 Comparison of 802.11g at 2.4Ghz and mmWave at 60 Ghz
Path Loss

E2E Delay (msec)

Exponent
(n)

IEEE 802.11g

IEEE 802.11ay

Path 1

Path 2

Path 3

Path 1

Path 2

Path 3

2

1.65

1.12

1.67

0.34

0.234

0.348

3

1.65

1.12

1.67

0.34

N/A

0.4122

4

1.65

1.12

1.67

N/A

N/A

N/A

and E = {e1 , e2 , · · · , eQ } is the set of all Q edges (links). For an edge q, 1 ≤
q ≤ Q, connecting nodes vi , vj ∈ V , we define the corresponding edge vector
aq ∈ RN ×1 , where the ith and j th elements are given by aq,i = 1 and aq,j = −1,
respectively, and the rest is zero. The relationship between the N vertices and
the corresponding Q links between those vertices in G is captured in a matrix
named the incidence matrix A ∈ RN ×Q , where the q th column is given by aq . For
this undirected graph, the Laplacian matrix L(A) ∈ RN ×N is defined as:
T

L(A) = AA =

Q
X

aq aTq .

(5.10)

q=1

The Laplacian matrix for such graph is positive semi-definite, which is expressed as L < 0 and also the smallest eigenvalue is zero, i.e., λ1 (L) = 0. The
second smallest eigenvalue of L, λ2 (L), is the algebraic connectivity of the graph
G also called Fiedler value [Fie73], which will be used in the rest of this chapter
to represent the network connectivity.
A UAV, as a hovering relay, can relay data packets between two nodes in the
network. Accordingly, deploying a UAV can create one or more links (edges) in
the baseline graph G(V, E), which results in a new graph G 0 (V, E0 ). The new
graph G 0 has the same number of N nodes, but with a larger set of edges denoted
by E0 with Q0 edges where Q0 ≥ Q, i.e., E ⊆ E0 . The potential increase in the
network connectivity, due to deploying UAVs, can be computed as λ2 (L0 ) − λ2 (L).

5.3
5.3.1

Problem Motivation and Formulation
Motivation

The motivation behind combining the UAVs’ deployment and multiple paths is
based on the potential impact of the upper layers for routing on enhancing the
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mmWave channel behavior. To demonstrate this, we conducted a simple experiment where IEEE 802.11g and IEEE 802.11ay MAC layer are used for routing
in an ad hoc network. We created a 10-node ad hoc network topology in the
NS-3 simulator and established 3 different routes from a source to its destination.
We transmitted data from the source to the destination under different path loss
exponents using Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) as the transport layer protocol. The results for packet delay are shown in Table 5.2. From these results,
we can see that the E2E delay when IEEE 802.11g is used is higher, but there is
always a successful packet routing. On the other hand, when IEEE 802.11ay is
used, we observe reduced E2E delay due to the higher transmission rate. However,
the packet receiving is not always guaranteed, even though TCP is used to ensure
re-transmissions in case of failures. For instance, under n = 4, no routes were
successful in transporting the packets. These results suggest that under mmWave
channels, the three routes need to be available for backup, and even this may
not be enough (i.e., see the case when n = 4), and thus additional relays might
be needed. Connectivity becomes a crucial concern to be able to benefit from
high-bandwidth mmWave communications. Next, we formulate our problem to
address the aforementioned concerns.

5.3.2

Problem Formulation

First, we introduce the optimization problem to enhance the network connectivity
with a maximum allowed constraint on the E2E delay between the desired source
and destination. We also consider finding the minimum number of KV UAVs, the
UAVs’ optimal locations, and transmission power.
Mathematically, this optimization problem can be formulated as follows:
max

U,Pq ,KV

s. t.

λ2 (L0 (U))
DE2E ≤ Dth ,
di,j ≤ R,
QV
X

(5.11)

Pq ≤ PV ,

q=1

where U is the 3 × KV UAVs position matrix in the Cartesian coordinate system
and Dth is the E2E delay threshold. In this chapter, we consider the Cartesian
coordinates to specify the UAV position and transmission direction, hence, we
assume a fixed UAV antenna angle.. Moreover, di,j where i, j ∈ 1, 2, · · · , KV denotes the distance between any 2 UAVs i and j. The maximum UAV transmission
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power is PV , and Pq is the UAV transmission power over each link q of QV , which
represents the total number of links provided by the UAV.
Once the UAVs are deployed through the optimization problem, we tackle
the improving reliability at the network layer problem. In order to increase the
network reliability for mmWave communication, a modified node-disjoint routing
multi-path protocol is proposed. Note that the same data will be sent through all
these node-disjoint paths simultaneously to increase the success rate. In this way,
the receiver can also select the minimum E2E delay path for multiple packets that
arrive for the same data. This approach also minimizes the potential interference
among inter-routes since the same nodes and links are not shared by different
routes.

5.4

Proposed Solution

In this section, we describe, in detail, the proposed solutions and algorithms to
find the optimal UAVs’ positions and the multi-path/parallel routing between a
particular source and a destination. The optimization problem solution is detailed
in Algorithm 2 in Section 5.4.1 while the routing technique is detailed in Algorithm
3 in Section 5.4.2.

5.4.1

Connectivity Optimization Relaxation and Solution

To address the indirect relation between the graph Laplacian matrix and the
UAVs position, we use a quantized grid such that the nodes are distributed over
h × h × h volume. Moreover, the search space over the x, y, and z axes is
uniformly quantized with a step size δ to get a search grid consisting of β candidate
positions for the UAV. This simplifies the Laplacian matrix to be represented by
the following formula:
0

L =L+

β
X

xj A0j A0T
j ,

(5.12)

j=1

where L is the original graph before UAV deployment, and xj is equal to one if
a UAV is positioned in the j th grid point, otherwise xj = 0. Moreover, A0j is the
incidence matrix when the UAV is deployed in this grid point.
Collecting xj , j ∈ {1, . . . , β}, in the β ×1 vector x, Eq. (5.12) can be written
as follows:
L0 = L + (x ⊗ IM ) Γ,

46

(5.13)

where Γ ,

h

T
A01 A0T
1

A0β A0T
β

, ...,

iT
.

Furthermore, we apply the quantized grid model over the E2E delay in a
b ∈ Rβ×1 = [b1 , b2 , · · · , bβ ]T such as
bi = DE2E |β=i .

(5.14)

where b is the vector of the minimum E2E delay over all the available paths
through the destination for all the β possible UAVs positions.
Hence, the optimization problem can be written in terms of the UAVs position
index vector x rather than its actual 3-D physical locations as follows:
max

x,Pq ,KV

s. t.

λ2 (L0 (x))
xT b ≤ Dth ,
xT di,j ≤ R,

(5.15)

QV

X

Pq ≤ PV ,

q=1

x ∈ {0, 1},
where, di,j is β × KV matrix representing the distance between any 2 UAVs.
Furthermore, the first constraint xT b ≤ Dth represents the E2E delay constraint,
where b is the vector of the E2E delay over all the available paths through the
destination.
Moreover, λ2 (L0 (A0 (x))) can be written as the point-wise infimum of a family
of linear functions of x as:
λ2 (L0 (A0 (x))) = inf [y T L0 (A0 (x))y, k y k2 = 1, 1T y = 0].
y

(5.16)

Hence, it is a concave function in x. The optimization problem can be written
as follows:
max

γ

x,log(Pq ),KV ,γ

s. t.

γ(I −

1 T
11 )  L0 (x, Pq , KV )
β

xT b ≤ Dth ,
xT di,j ≤ R,
QV
X

Pq ≤ PV ,

q=1

1T x <= KV , x ∈ [0, 1].
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(5.17)

Investigating the problem convexity, the objective function, γ, is linear in the
optimization variables. Moreover, the first constraint is a semi-definite constraint.
The second constraint, xT b ≤ Dth is also a linear constraint in its general form
as proven in details in Appendix II.
In addition, the rest of the constraints are linear in x. Therefore, the optimization problem is a convex optimization problem with linear constraints. The
optimization problem in Eq.(5.17) can be written as a Semi-definite Programming (SDP), a sub category of the convex optimization, after relaxing the binary
constraint in x to be real value between 0 and 1, as follows:
max

γ

x,log(Pq ),KV ,γ

s. t.

γ(I −

1 T
11 )  L0 (x, Pq , KV )
β

xT b ≤ Dth ,
xT di,j ≤ R,
QV
X

(5.18)

Pq ≤ PV ,

q=1

1T x <= KV , 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
The relaxed SDP problem in Eq. (5.18) can be solved using an SDP solver
such as CVX SDPT3 solver [GBY08].
Algorithm 2 summarizes the solution presented above as follows: The first step
is to quantize the 3-D grid to the h×h×h cubs. In the next step, every time a UAV
is added to the grid, a new graph incidence matrix A0 (x) is reconstructed for all the
permutations P erm(β) of all possible UAV positions on the grid. Additionally, the
distance matrix D of the network is established for all P erm(β). The algorithm,
then, strives to optimize the maximum network connectivity that satisfies the
requirement of the network E2E delay to be less than Dth by adding more UAVs.
After the optimization is done and all the UAVs’ positions are found in the grid, a
post-processing algorithm is performed to obtain the UAVs’ Cartesian coordinates
by choosing the maximum KV elements in x.

5.4.2

Parallel Multi-path Routing

After the UAVs’ positions have been determined, the next step is to find the multipath routing to increase the mmWave links’ reliability. The aim is to increase the
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Algorithm 2 UAVs Positioning
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:

Input: (X, Y, Z) and KV = 1
A ← the graph incidence Matrix
λ2 (L(A)) ← Network connectivity of G
K ← The maximum available UAVs
Quantize:
β ← Grid positions; x ← β × 1 vector
P erm(β) ← permutation of all grid positions
for ∀KV ≤ K & ∀P (β) do
Link Matrix :
A0 (x) ← Link matrix after adding U AV s
L0 (x) ← Laplacian matrix after adding U AV s
E2E ← The E2E delay
end for
Optimization:
maxx λ2 (L0 (A0 (x)))
if xT b ≤ Dth & UAV total power ≤ PV then
Break
else
goto Optimization.
(XV , YV , ZV ) ← maxx .
end if
Loop:
if di,j > R then
KV ← KV + 1
(XV , YV , ZV ) ← maxx .
goto Loop.
end if
Output: (XV , YV , ZV ), Pq and KV

network reliability for the mmWave communication by sending the same data
packets in parallel over multiple alternative paths.
Sending packets through multiple paths will be challenging at the upper layers
in terms of implementation. For instance, if TCP is to be used, some changes
will be needed since TCP establishes a connection that is maintained during data
transmission at all times. If a node has multiple IP interfaces, the current multipath TCP (MPTCP) standard [PJZ17] can be utilized for parallel transmission.
However, in our case, drones and other mobile nodes may not have such resources,
and thus, new approaches are needed.
To this end, we assume that a node will use source routing (such as dynamic
source routing (DSR) [JM96, JMB+ 01]) to pick among multiple available paths,
labeling them separately just like multi-protocol layer switching (MPLS)-based
routing [DR00, XHBN00]. Those labels can be incorporated in the TCP header’s
unused bits so that the receiving party can differentiate between different route
packets. In the case of User Datagram Protocol (UDP), there is still a need for
MPLS with fewer bits needed to be added to the UDP header.
We propose a multi-path protocol that is a modified node-disjoint routing ap-

49

Algorithm 3 Multi-path Routes
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:

Input: (X, Y, Z), (XV , YV , ZV ), Dth and KV
Q00 ← The total number of links after adding the UAVs
G 00 ← (V00 , E00 ) The network graph including the UAVs
root ← The source node s
t ← [] initial empty spanning tree
c ← Initial cost = 0
for i ≤ N + KV do
if root ∈
/ t then
t ← root
c ← c + DE2E
end if
end for
TC ← Total Cost vector on all the paths
ST ← Spanning Tree
for ∀t ∈ ST do
if ST ∩ t 6= Φ||c > Dth then
ST ← ST − t
TC ← TC − c
H ← The number of hops ∀ST
end if
end for
pathi ← ST|min(H,c)
for ∀ ST do
if [N + 1 : N + KV ] ∈ ST & ST ∩ [1 : N ] − [s, r] = Φ then
pathi+1 ← ST|min(H,c)
end if
end for
Output: path1 , path2 , · · · , pathi .

proach to minimize potential interference among inter-routes; to enable parallel
transmissions from the same source. In this setting, original network nodes are
allowed to be used only once, while UAVs are considered to be reusable on several
paths. The justification of such a model is that the UAVs are movable and adjustable to avoid link failure, whereas the nodes in the network can not be easily
adjusted. Here, we propose an algorithm to determine the available paths that
are independent of each other (i.e., they do not share any links or intermediate
nodes) so that there will be very diverse options to send the packets, increasing
the chances to make it to the receiver. Note that, given that all the nodes and
their locations are known in advance; then, this will be a centralized algorithm
running at the source node, which is in line with the source routing concept we
offer. Basically, the source will determine the routes, label each route, and maintain them locally. Whenever a packet is to be sent, the route will be included in
the packet header.
The proposed algorithm to find the multiple paths is shown in Algorithm 3.
In this algorithm, an undirected finite graph G 00 (V00 , E00 ) is created to represent
this new network topology that consists of the original network and the deployed
UAVs. V00 = {v1 , v2 , · · · , vN +KV } is the set of the N nodes constructing the
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original network and E00 = {e1 , e2 , · · · , eQ00 } is the set of all Q00 edges (links). The
new graph G 00 is different from G 0 in the connectivity calculations as it has N +KV
nodes.
Moreover, the weights of each link represent the E2E delay of the data transmission over this link. Our algorithm will find all the spanning trees, ST, and
the corresponding cost (E2E delay) for each tree, TC, between the source s and
destination r. Next, we only choose the spanning trees with disjoint vertices (except for the UAVs) and have a total cost less than the E2E delay threshold, Dth .
Finally, we select the i routes with the lowest number of hops to be our paths of
transmission, path1 , path2 , · · · , pathi .
By using the constraint in Eq. (5.18):
xT di,j ≤ R

(5.19)

a direct path over the UAVs can be formed as a backup route that guarantees
the independence of this route from any other routes uses existing nodes. Thus,
potential link failures that may happen within the existing network among the
nodes will not impact this route. Finally, while power consumption is vital in the
UAV deployment optimization, once they are on-site, they can be replaced when
their batteries approach critical levels.

5.5
5.5.1

Performance Evaluation
Simulation Setup

In this section, we present the simulation results to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. The two algorithms presented in Section 5.4 are
first implemented in MATLAB to obtain the UAVs’ positions and the multi-path
routes. Then, for testing our model in a realistic scenario, the obtained data
from MATLAB is fed into a widely used NS-3 simulator to calculate the actual
throughput and E2E delay. The optimization approaches are implemented in
MATLAB R2016a using the CVX solver.
For NS-3, we used version 3.26 and have adopted the IEEE 802.11ad implementation described in [AW16] and updated the physical layer to match the
IEEE 802.11ay MIMO transmission. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first multi-hop implementation of IEEE 802.11ad/ay in NS-3.
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Table 5.3 Simulation Parameters.
Parameter
Value
MATLAB Parameters
W
2.16 GHz
f
56.16 GHz
PV
30 dBm
σ02
-130 dBm
n
4 (suburban environment)
Dth
3 msec
NS-3 Parameters
Simulation time
10 sec
Video size
290 MB
Number of frames
2000
Image resolution
352 × 288
Frame size
30 fps
Modulation and Coding Scheme (MCS)
18 − 25
PHY Type
"DMG-MCS"
Antennas
1
Antenna Sectors
3
Transmission (Tx) Power
10 dBm
Tx Gain
23
Rx Gain
23

The system parameters used throughout the experiments for MATLAB and
NS-3 are listed in Table 5.3. N nodes are deployed with a uniform random
distribution within an area of 100 × 100 m. For the evaluation on NS-3, we
created a scenario to send data between a source and destination over multi hops
using the same setting as in the MATLAB evaluation. As mmWave is a better
match for high-bandwidth traffics, we investigated the proposed approaches under
the high-rate multimedia transmission. We utilized the Evalvid tool-set [KRW03]
that is designed for video management. In this scenario, the highway reference
video from Evalvid which is around 290 MB and consists of 2000 frames, is used
as the multimedia traffic.
The following metrics are used to evaluate our approach:
• Connectivity: The connectivity, λ2 (L(x)), refers to Eq. (5.10) used in Section 5.2.3. That parameter shows whether the nodes are highly connected or
not and indicates the level of connectedness. This parameter demonstrates
the effectiveness of the optimal positioning optimization problem in Eq.
(5.11). The increase of this parameter indicates better coverage between
nodes in the network, resulting in better communication performance.
• E2E Delay: This is the total delay between the source and the destination
nodes. In MATLAB, we calculate the E2E delay as in Eq. (5.4) in Section
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5.3. In NS-3, it is calculated from the receiver’s perspective after receiving
the real packet from the sender. The effectiveness of our proposed routing
solution along with the optimal position reflects in a better E2E delay.
• Throughput: The throughput is used within NS-3 to represent the number
of bits successfully received at the receiver side in a second.

5.5.2

Baselines for Comparison

We consider two types of network topologies. The first type is the original network
before the UAV deployment, while the second type is the network with UAVs after
the optimization. In these networks, the following paths are compared:
• Baseline path: refers to the shortest path in the original network to reach
the destination;
• Hybrid path: refers to the optimized path with the minimum number of
hops that includes the node(s) in the original network and UAV(s) to reach
the destination.
• UAV-only path: refers to the path that uses only UAV(s) to reach the
destination. This path type is critical when there are not enough nodes to
form an adequate route.
• Parallel Multi-path: This path represents the multi-path communication
where the data is sent over both the Hybrid and UAV-only paths in parallel
to ensure reliability.

5.5.3

Performance Results

UAVs Placement Evaluation
We considered several network topologies with a different number of nodes, and
we computed the optimal number and the UAVs’ location.
To initially investigate our proposed solution, we first conducted a simple
experiment. Specifically, we compare the number of UAVs needed for an initial
network with 5 nodes to the same network after adding 5 more nodes to have a
total of 10 nodes. We assume the same positions for the source and the destination
nodes. The number of UAVs added for the first case (Fig.5.4a) is 3 while it is 2
for the second case (in Fig.5.4b), depending on the need of the network. Fig. 5.5
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Fig. 5.4 UAV positioning for different number of nodes. The cross and diamond
markers represent nodes and UAVs, respectively.
further investigates the UAV transmission range on the number of UAV needed
in both 5 and 10 nodes network. As shown in the figure, the number of UAVs
required decreases with the UAV range extension; and it settles to only 1 UAV
when the range is almost covering the whole area.
Next, the achieved enhancement in the network algebraic connectivity is assessed before and after using the UAVs with the network growth. As seen in Fig.
5.6, the algebraic connectivity after adding the UAVs with optimal positioning
is higher than that of the original network without the UAVs. The connectivity
for our approach is enhanced by almost 200% at N = 10 and 66% at N = 30
compared to the original network.
Furthermore, the results depicted in Fig. 5.7 shows that the average number
of UAVs needed tends to decrease with the increased number of nodes. That is
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Fig. 5.5 The number of UAVs required for different UAV transmission range.
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Fig. 5.6 The network connectivity enhancement through UAVs.

due to increasing the number of nodes in the same area, and as a result, more links
are created between original nodes and decreases the need for UAVs to support
the network connectivity.
Routing Performance
Next, we investigate the E2E delay and throughput performance for the proposed
routing algorithm compared to the original network.
First, we study the performance of using a single path with the deployment of
UAVs while parallel multi-paths are available. To this end, we fixed N to 50 and
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Fig. 5.7 Average number of UAVs needed for different N .

determined three node-disjoint paths (i.e., Path 1, Path 2, and Path 3) with the
lowest E2E delay (from MATLAB results) from the same source and destination
in the original network topology. We report the NS-3 results of the throughput
(TP) and E2E delay per frame transmission for these paths when UDP is used
as the transport layer protocol in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 Path Performance Comparison.
Path 1

Path 2

Path 3

Original Network (No UAVs)
TP (MB/s)

0.31

0.23

0.17

E2E (ms)

0.4664

0.63

0.83

Network with UAVs
TP (MB/s)

0.73

0.58

0.8

E2E (ms)

0.20

0.25

0.18

The results show a significant improvement in both TP and E2E for the network after adding the UAVs. In some cases, the TP triples on average, and the
E2E delay reduces to less than half. Because the UAVs are placed in locations
that will reduce the E2E delay based on the proposed solution/ optimization. The
decrease in E2E delay also enables increased TP. In addition, we speculate that
the paths for the original network might have fewer hops and thus the longer distance between nodes, which impacts the packet delivery ratio (PDR) in mmWave
links. That is not the case in our approach since the number of hops increases
while the distance between nodes decreases, enabling better PDR. Hence, we in-
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vestigated the effect of the Modulation and Coding Scheme (MCS) index on the
PDR for the baseline, original network, and our approach for N = 10 in Table
5.5. The results show that the original network has a high packet loss for the
MCS index under 18, while the proposed optimal UAVs positioning optimization
has no packet loss even with a low-quality MCS index. The reason behind the
high packet loss in the original network is that the nodes are long distanced, and
the mmWave channel is lossy.
Table 5.5 Original Network Packet Delivery Ratio
MCS Index

Transmitted frames

Received Frames

PDR

Original Network (No UAVs)
10

2106

151

7%

11

2106

679

32%

12

2106

1697

81%

18

2106

2106

100%

2106

100%

Network with UAVs
10-18

2106

On the other hand, using TCP transmission may add extra overhead to the
E2E delay due to the TCP handshake process for the network with UAVs. To
investigate this point, we transmit 10, 000 packets with a packet rate of 4 MB/sec
and a packet interval of 16 µsec/packet for both UDP and TCP NewReno for
N = 50. The results in Table 5.6 shows a lower E2E delay for the UDP connection
due to the TCP setup process.
In the next experiment, we investigated the achieved enhancement in the E2E
delay and TP between the source and destination nodes
Table 5.6 UDP vs. TCP Performance Comparison
Min. delay paths
Path 1
Path 2
Path 3

UDP
0.018
0.015
0.038

E2E (ms)
TCP NewReno
0.034
0.025
0.072

As shown in Fig. 5.8(a), the multi-path approach uses parallel communication
over both the hybrid and UAV-only paths. Then, the E2E delay achieved will be
equal to the minimum E2E delay of both paths. In other words, the receiver would
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Fig. 5.8 The E2E delay and throughput for different N .

pick the frame which arrives first. So in all cases, our proposed approach achieved
the least E2E delay. The improvement concerning no UAV-case (baseline) is
particularly significant when the network size is smaller (i.e., above 50%) as there
are no alternative path options for such smaller sizes. Comparing the Hybrid
Path and UAV-only path, we see that the results are close to each other. But
Hybrid Path performs better as the number of nodes increases, giving more path
options to be used.
Looking at the TP in Fig. 5.8(b), we observe that it increases for the Hybrid
Path approach as better paths are becoming available with the increased number
of nodes. In such cases, our multi-path approach benefits from such an increase
in terms of TP as it utilizes that path instead of the UAV-only one. The UAVonly path does not benefit from the growth of the network as it solely relies on
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UAVs. These results are consistent with the E2E delay results. As a result, we
can conclude that the parallel multi-path approach performs the best in terms
of E2E delay and TP in all cases, which indicates its effectiveness. These results
further emphasize our model appropriateness for emergency management and first
responder applications with high bandwidth streaming requirements.
On the other hand, multi-path parallel transmission adds an extra overhead by
introducing redundant transmissions. However, these parallel transmissions are
needed to guarantee the delivery and increase the overall throughput, as shown
in the experiments aforementioned (Fig. 5.8). Hence, to justify our multi-path
parallel transmission overhead, we conducted some experiments to include results
on how TCP performance improves by reporting the number of re-transmissions
compared to actual transmissions. For this set of experiments, we used the following TCP settings: TCP NewReno with a total of 10, 000 transmitting packets
with a packet rate of 4 MB/sec and a packet interval of 16 µsec/packet. As
shown in Fig. 5.9, the baseline TCP re-transmissions are much higher than our
proposed scheme, even for the multi-path transmission. For example, at N = 30
nodes, the TCP re-transmissions are around 350 packets; but with our proposed
scheme, the TCP re-transmissions are around 50 − 60 packets on the Uav-Only
and the Hybrid paths. Moreover, even with the two parallel paths, the total TCP
re-transmissions are just a little above 100 packets, which is almost 75% fewer
re-transmissions.

TCP Retransmissions
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Hybrid Path
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Number of Nodes
Fig. 5.9 TCP re-transmissions overhead for different N .
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Fig. 5.10 Optimization vs NS-3 E2E delay for different N .

Comparison of Optimization and NS-3 Results
An important factor in the evaluation is the accuracy of optimization results
concerning a real-life situation. Thus, we compared the NS-3 results with other
optimization results from MATLAB on the same topologies. Fig. 5.10 shows
the E2E delay from the MATLAB optimization compared to the NS-3 simulator.
As can be seen, the optimization results show slightly lower E2E delays since
the deployment in a realistic environment faces uncertainties and complexities
that could not be captured within analytical models. However, the trends match
perfectly and indicate the validity of the optimization results. The slight difference
can be attributed to various overheads in actual transmissions: For instance, the
delay may be due to half-duplex operations in NS-3 and the processing delay at
the receiver side when dealing with multiple redundant transmissions. In addition,
the processing of packet headers at the receiver side adds to the total delay.

Appendix I
Here, we investigate the delay performance for the packet transmit over each path
of the multi-path communication with a total queue delay is,
Dq = minM

P

N0
n=1

WN + Ws



(5.20)

where Dq is the total queuing delay at any node i and Ws is the total queuing
delay at the source node. Furthermore, calculating the total queuing delay for
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each path requires the queuing delay for each node in that path, hence, the need
for queuing analysis at each node.
Source node with M/G/1 queue
We begin the queuing analysis with the queuing model at the source node with
the M/G/1 model shown in Fig. 5.3. The M/G/1 waiting delay at the source
node is as follows [JS96],
Wq,s =

2
+ E{Z}2 )
λi (σs,i
,
2(1 − ρ)

(5.21)

2
are the arriving rate to the queue, the service process
where λi , E{Z} and σs,i

expectation and the service process variance at node i which is the source node
in this case, respectively. Moreover, ρ = λi /µi is the service utilization, where µi
is the service rate of the queue and 0 ≤ ρ < 1. Then, the total queue delay at
node s is,
Ws = Wq,s +

1
.
µi

(5.22)

Furthermore, this model’s service process depends on the mmWave channel
statistics and the probability distribution density function (PDF) of proper transmission. In this chapter, we utilize the 10° transmit antenna. The K-factor expresses the relative strength of both the direct and the scattered components of
the received signal with a Rician distribution [TAG03, ABA+ 15]. The K-factor
provides an indication of link quality and the received power in a reach scattering
environment. Hence, the K-factor is fitted to a Gaussian distribution with mean
of E{X} and variance of σX where X = PRx of Prob{X ≤ Pth } where Pth is the
threshold received power for a proper communication.
Nodes with G/G/1 queue
Now, we investigate the queuing analysis with the queuing model at all other
nodes with the G/G/1 model shown in Fig. 5.3. The G/G/1 waiting delay is
following Kingman’s formula [Kin62], which is an approximation formula for the
mean waiting time in a G/G/1 queue and is known to be generally very accurate.
Then, the queue waiting time at any node i is as follows
Wq,i =

C 2 + Cs2 1
ρi
· a
· ,
1 − ρi
2
µi

(5.23)

where ρi = λi /µi is the service utilization and Ca and Cs are the coefficient
of variation for the arrival and service processes, respectively. The coefficient
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of variation is a standardized measure of the dispersion of random variable g
a probability distribution function and equal to the standard deviation of the
distribution divided by its mean, C = σg /E{g}.
Then the queue waiting time can be approximated as follows
Wq,i =

σY2



dr,i
ds,i |ds,i − dr,i |

n
.

(5.24)

Hance, the queue waiting time is a linear function of the distances. Then, the
total delay at any node N (except the source node s) is,

n
dr,i
2
Wi = σY
+ E{Y }d−n
s,i .
ds,i |ds,i − dr,i |

(5.25)

Appendix II
In order to establish convexity of the constraints of the proposed optimization
problem, the following constraints are linear so no need for further convex investigation,
xT di,j ≤ R,
QV
X

(5.26)

Pq ≤ PV ,

q=1

1T x <= KV , x ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, we only need to establish the convexity of the E2E delay constraint
with respect to the optimization variables, x, log(Pq ), and KV . Moreover, as
aforementioned in Section 5.4.1 the problem is solved for one UAV at a time, then
the optimization variables that affect the optimization are only x and log(Pq ).
From Eq. (5.4), the E2E delay, DE2E , is given by:
(5.27)

DE2E = Dt + Dp + Dq ,
where,
Dt = N 0

m
min{i,j}∈S Ri,j

PN 0
Dp =

{i,j}∈S

kui − uj k2
c

(5.28)

,

,

(5.29)

0

Dq =

N
X

Wi + Ws .

(5.30)

i=1

Furthermore, the E2E delay has three terms, it suffices to prove that each term is
convex in x and log(Pq ); this follows from the fact that the sum of convex functions
is also convex [BV04]. We can validate the convexity of DE2E by examining the
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Hessian of each term. The hessian matrix for two optimization variables is as
follows



Hn (x, log(Pq )) = 

δ 2 F (x,log(Pq ))
δx2

δ 2 F (x,log(Pq ))
δxδ log(Pq )

δ 2 F (x,log(Pq ))

δ 2 F (x,log(P

δ log(Pq )δx

δ log(Pq

q ))
)2



,

(5.31)

if the hessian matrix of a function is positive semi-definite in the optimization
variables, Hn (x, log(Pq ))  0, that means it is a convex function. Also, if the
hessian matrix of a function is negative definite in the optimization variables,
Hn (x, log(Pq ))  0, that means it is a concave function.
First for Dt in Eq. (5.28), from the convex set properties the function 1/f (x)
is convex if and only if the function f (x) is a function convexity preserving and
its interior is also convex.
The min function is a convexity preserving function [BV04], i.e., we only need
to prove that the interior function, Ri,j , is convex. The Ri,j can be written as
Ruav,j ≤ W [log2 (Pq ) + 2 log2 (|hi,r |) − n log(duav,j )
!
#
N
X
−n
2
− log2
expPq |hi,r | dj,r − log(σ02 ),

(5.32)

j=1,j6=i

Whereas, the only rate, Ri,j , that depend on the UAV location and power are
the links that connects the nodes through the UAV Then, applying the hessian
matrix on Eq. (5.32) Hn (DT x (x, log(Pq ))), then the function is convex as it can
be shown as a zero matrix, Which indicate that it is a linear function, hence, Ri,j
is convex. Second, we inspect DP which can be written as follows
PN 0
Dp =

{i,j}∈S

c

xT Di,j

(5.33)

where, Di,j ∈ Rβ×N is the quantized distances between any 2 nodes i and j.
Moreover, this term is linear x, hence, it is convex. The convex investigation
for the queue delay model is a quadratic function of the distances. Furthermore,
the convexity investigation for Dp fit for the second and third constraints in Eq.
(5.19), is a linear constraint as it sums over log(Pq ). Moreover, Dq is a positive
quadratic function in x and log(Pq ).
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CHAPTER 6
EFFICIENT AUTHENTICATION OF DRONES TO MMWAVE
WIRELESS MESH NETWORKS IN POST-DISASTER
SCENARIOS

6.1

Introduction

In post-disaster circumstances such as hurricanes and earthquakes, the communication and power infrastructures could be damaged, disconnecting affected communities from the rest of the world. Hence, restoring communication networks
is vital for damage assessment and to start the recovery process. Public safety
agencies and local governments are currently considering the deployment of UAVs,
commonly known as drones. In a rapid post-disaster recovery, drones can act as
relays among people in affected areas and local authorities. Therefore, in this
chapter, we first propose a proxy-based scheme for drone-to-drone authentication. We delegate one of the drones to sign the authentication warrant on behalf
of a CC to reduce the communication time energy. In this way, we ensure that a
newcomer drone’s authentication with one of the existing drones would suffice as it
represents others in the network through the proxy features. The second scenario,
considered in this chapter, focuses on trust among the deployed drones and the
ground nodes. A drone may act as an imposter to deceive ground nodes. Therefore, there is a need for authentication of drones to ground nodes. This chapter
aims to find an efficient way of authentication between a drone and its associated ground nodes, based on group authentication that significantly reduces the
authentication’s overhead. Thus, we propose adopting a broadcast-based group
authentication scheme where a simple challenge-response authentication is followed. The signed messages in the broadcast utilize the proxy signature of the
CC.
We implemented the two proposed authentication schemes in the NS-3 network
simulator by utilizing an underlying IEEE 802.11ad communication environment
that enables mesh networking among the ground nodes and drones. We implemented other baselines to compare with our approaches and assessed the overhead
that comes with authentication. The results indicate that our mmWave-based
authentication approaches can significantly reduce the authentication time and
energy consumption.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The system and attach models
are described in Section 4.2. The proposed authentication schemes are introduced
in Section 6.3. Finally, the evaluation and the security analysis are in Section 6.4.

6.2

System and Attack Models

Fig. 6.1 Envisioned adhoc wireless mesh network of drones and ground users.

6.2.1

System Model

We assume a post-disaster scenario where most of the cellular base-stations and
cable/DSL infrastructure have been damaged and not functioning. To enable
communication among citizens and emergency crew, we assume that a certain
number of drones could be deployed within a neighborhood in order to form a temporary ad hoc wireless mesh network among user smartphones/laptops or WiFi
routers in their homes. We assume these drones can act semi-autonomously to
make their own decisions once deployed. For providing high bandwidth multimedia communications, we assume these drones are capable of supporting mmWave
communications such as IEEE 802.11ad standard, which operates at the 60GHz
frequency. We consider that each user (ground) node has installed an emergency
client application in advance to be used in the aftermath of a disaster where there
is no Internet access. We assume a control center, CC, maintained by public-safety
personnel, which can send drones to the region of interest to form a wireless mesh
network where these drones serve as relay nodes to ground user nodes shown in
Fig. 6.1. One of the drones can act as a gateway to connect to the CC using a
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wide area communication standard such as LoRa [MCV17]. The notations used
through this chapter are defined in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Notations.
Parameter
D0

Observer drone.

P ubD0

Observer drone public key.

IDD0

Observer drone pseudonym.

CC

Control center.

certcc

CC’s certificate.

Gj

j th ground node.

IDGj

Ground node ID.

P ubGj

Ground node public key.

wDi
(ri , si )
(P ubDproxy i , P rivDproxy i )

6.2.2

Definition

The CC warrant.
The CC delegation keys pair.
Proxy signature public-private key pair.

Attack Model

We assume that there may be malicious drones as they are deployed externally,
but the ground nodes will be trusted. The drones do not collude, and there is
time synchronization among the nodes. The following attacks are considered:
• A malicious drone can act as an imposter and become part of the wireless mesh
network. Once becoming a mesh node, a malicious drone may not honor routing
and forwarding (i.e., block messages, change the messages, etc.). It also can be
a passive attack to collect private information coming from ground users.
• Without becoming part of the wireless mesh network, a malicious drone can
broadcast messages to ground nodes claiming to be a gateway for them. In such
cases, private user data can be collected from the ground users.

6.3

Proposed Authentication Schemes

The drone authentication problem with the presence of new drones and ground
users to form an IEEE 802.11ad-based wireless mesh network can be divided into
two sub-problems: (1) the mutual authentication among drones for new and legitimate drone deployment; and (2) the drone-to-ground nodes authentication. Our
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proposed idea of the authentication scheme is based on proxy delegation from the
CC for both cases. As such, rather than allowing each drone pair to authenticate
each other mutually, we follow a more efficient approach where authentication
with any of the drones would suffice. Given the nature of mmWave links, this
process will be much faster and enable energy-efficiency in terms of drone movement. To enable this delegation, we utilize the proxy signature concept [LKK01].
The motivation comes from the fact that one can designate a proxy to sign messages on behalf of him/herself. The delegation can be in different forms, but
eventually, the proxy’s signature can be traced back to the original signer for
verification. In our case, we will utilize the signature as an indication for device
(source) authentication. We propose that the CC designate the drones as their
proxies so that the drones can authenticate themselves to the post-disaster wireless mesh network as new devices. The details proposed approaches are discussed
next.

6.3.1

Registration Phase

The first step in the network formation is the registration phase where the ground
nodes within the envisioned mesh network are determined. To this end, the control center will designate an observer drone, D0 , which will hoover above the region
of interest to collect information from the interested ground nodes. Specifically,
the observer drone D0 broadcasts a message that includes its public key P ubD0 ,
its unique pseudonym IDD0 , and the CC’s certificate, certcc . The observer drone
then collects the responses from any ground node which would like to become part
of this mesh network. Note that the emergency client application on a ground
node comes pre-installed with the public key of a certificate authority (CA) that
can be used to verify any signature coming from the CC. Through this client app,
any ground node, Gj will send a reply message that includes its unique ground
node ID IDGj , public key P ubGj , its location, and its received signal strength
indicator (RSSI) value. In the end, all the collected ground node info will be sent
to the control center using LoRa by the observer drone. Based on the collected
data, the CC optimally computes the number of (M − 1) new drones that need
to be deployed and the best M locations for these new drones and the observer
drone to maximize the communication throughput and enhance the link qualities
by utilizing some of the existing solutions [AMIMA19].
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6.3.2

Delegation Phase

Before the CC releases the additional (M − 1) drones to these locations, it performs some initial configurations to these drones first simply by manually accessing the drones and installing the needed parameters for the proxy signature
creation as used in [LKK01]. To enable this, we assume that each drone Di ,
i = 1, 2, ..., (M − 1) has a pair of public-private key (P ubDi , P rivDi ).
As part of this proxy signature, the CC creates a warrant wDi for each Di by
signing the drone’s public key with its private key P rivcc : wDi = S(P ubDi , P rivcc ),
where S() is any digital signature function. Then, a pair of CC delegation keys
(ri , si ) is created for drone Di as follows: Let g be a generator of a multiplicative
subgroup of Zp∗ with order p. The CC chooses a random number ki ∈R Zp∗ and
calculates these keys:
ri = g ki ,

(6.1)

si = P rivcc H(wDi , ri ) + ki ,
where, H() is a collision resistant hash function.
Along with these keys, a delegation message of a tuple (wDi , ri , si , certcc ) is
created and installed in each drone Di , which can now create a proxy public-private
key pair
(P ubDproxy i , P rivDproxy i )
using the info in the delegation message to sign any message on behalf of the CC
as follows:
P rivDproxy i = si + H(wDi , ri )P rivDi
H(wDi ,ri )

P ubDproxy i = (P ubcc P ubDi )

(6.2)

ri

Since P rivDproxy i is only known by Di , the proxy signature can be only created by
a legitimate drone Di . Note that the same process was used to create the proxy
key pair of the observer drone D0 .

6.3.3

Drone-to-Drone Mutual Authentication

Once the drones go to their locations, each drone Di initiates the authentication
process by creating a timestamp nonce tDi , and then signs this nonce with its
proxy private key P rivDproxy i : σi = S(tDi , P rivDproxy i ). Di then broadcasts a
proxy signature that contains the following tuple: (tDi , σi , wDi , ri , P ubDi ). Any
other drone, say Dj , within the vicinity will be able to verify this proxy signature
by verifying whether the proxy signature is valid. The following equation can do
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this verification:
?

V(tDi , σi , (certcc P ubDi )H(wDi ,P ubD i ) ri ) = T rue

(6.3)

where V() is a digital signature verification algorithm. Note that this process can
happen simultaneously for every drone, which can save significant time. However,
due to drones’ potential varying arrival times to their locations, some drones may
not receive these broadcasts on time. Therefore, the broadcasts from Di should
continue until the neighboring drone(s) such as Dj replies back with the same
message but with a different timestamp. The timestamps are used to prevent any
replay attacks from malicious drones. This process is shown in Fig. 6.2. In this
way, both drones are authenticated each other and can now become part of the
mesh network.
Note that as long as a drone broadcasts a proxy signature, it can be authenticated with the rest of the drones without needing individual authentications. This
model saves us time and energy in the context of the public safety application.

Fig. 6.2 Message exchanges among drones for mutual authentication.

6.3.4

Drone-to-Ground Authentication

The next step in forming the proposed wireless mesh networks is to ensure that
the ground nodes trust the newly joining drones. In this section, we propose a
device authentication mechanism to legitimize the drones to the ground nodes in
the network and avoid any illegitimate drone communicating with these nodes in
the context of the disaster applications. Given the nature of mmWave communications, we opted for a group authentication scheme where we can easily reach
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Fig. 6.3 Clustering of ground nodes to be served by a particular drone.

out to many nodes with a single message to achieve faster processing and eliminate any redundant messages as they can be easily lost. Note that authenticating
nodes pair by pair is time and power-consuming for both the drones and the nodes
in a disaster situation, particularly in the context of the mmWave channel.
To enable group authentication, we first need to divide the ground nodes into
the clusters where a drone will be responsible for serving each cluster, as shown in
Fig. 6.3. In order to enable this, each ground node should select a drone. When
a drone does a broadcast, a ground node may hear from multiple of these drones
depending on its location. We assume that the ground node will pick the drone
whose message arrives first.
As the goal is to authenticate drones as entities that these ground nodes can
trust, we propose using a one-time challenge-response protocol based on publickey cryptography. The motivation also comes from the fact that the ground nodes
and the drones cannot agree on a symmetric key easily. This will introduce extra
communication or other mechanisms that may not be suitable for disaster cases.
Thus, we opt for a group-based challenge-response as we do not want to perform
this process one-by-one with each ground node.
Nevertheless, we still rely on the proxy-signatures generated by the CC. The
idea is to send a challenge to each ground node from their respective drone through
a broadcast message. This challenge will include a proxy signature from the drone
(i.e., delegated by the CC) that needs to be verified by each ground node. To this
end, each drone Di prepares and broadcast a proxy signature to its cluster that
contains the following tuple:
Di → ∀nodes : (IDDi , ti , wDi , βi , certCC , P ubDi )
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(6.4)

where βi = S((IDDi ||wDi ||ti ), P rivDproxy i ) is a signed message consisting of
drone ID, its warrant, and a timestamp ti using the drone’s proxy private key
P rivDproxy i .
On receiving this broadcast proxy signature, a ground node, Gj , first verifies
?

the warrant to ensure that it is signed by the private key of the CC: V(P ubDi , wDi , certcc ) =
T rue. Next, it verifies the proxy signature to ensure that it is signed by the proxy
private key of Di :
?

V((IDDi ||wDi ||ti ), βi , (certcc P ubDi )H(wDi ,ri ) ri ) = T rue.

(6.5)

Note that it can also verify the signature of CC using CA’s private key which was
pre-installed.

6.4

Security and Performance Analysis

In this section, we first discuss the security analysis of the proposed schemes
and then present the simulation results to demonstrate the proposed scheme’s
effectiveness.

6.4.1

Security Analysis

In order to join the network, a legitimate drone Di will need to show that it has
a valid and unique pair of proxy key, which is created based on a unique pair of
delegation key given by the CC to the drone Di . A malicious drone Dm needs
to broadcast a proxy signature message (either to other drones or ground nodes)
that can be verified using the Dm ’s proxy public key. Since the delegation phase is
conducted manually and securely prior to the drones’ release to the new location,
Dm will not be able to create its pair of the proxy key since it does not have the
unique pair of delegation key. Hence, it cannot join and become part of the mesh
network.
Dm may also try to impersonate a legitimate drone Di by performing a replay
attack where it replays a captured message from Di either for joining the network
or claiming as the gateway for ground nodes. In both cases, Dm broadcasts
the whole proxy signature of drone Di , (tDi , σi , wDi , P ubDP roxy i , P ubDi ). Let us
assume a verifier node (either drone or ground node) Xk receives this broadcast
for the first time. This proxy signature will not pass the verification using Eq.
6.3 due to stale timestamp value in the message. That applies to Eq. 6.5 in the
same manner.
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6.4.2

Experimental Setup

We used NS-3 [NSN16] network simulator to performed the evaluations. We
adopted the IEEE 802.11ad mmWave implementation described in [AW16] as
the underlying communication for the drone-to-drone and drone-to-ground nodes
communications. We used the following IEEE 802.11ad parameters for the experiments: PHY Type = DMG-MCS18, Antenna Sector =8, Transmission Power =10
dBm, and Transmitter and Receiver gain=23. The LoRa connection from observer drone to CC is also implemented using the NS-3 LoRa module. The CC
is assumed at 1km from the observer node. We used a Raspberry Pi IoT device
to mimic constrained drone processing power and measure the required cryptographic operations’ authentication times. These collected authentication times
are then utilized in NS-3 to make a realistic simulation scenario. We used ECC
for signatures. The key size is set to 260 bits.
ND number of drones are placed to cover the whole area of interest. Each
drone covers an area of 100 × 100 m2 . The ground node density in an area is
varied in terms of the number of ground nodes. We used different number of
ground nodes (i.e., (10, 20, · · · , 50)) for the evaluations. The positions of the
ground nodes are randomly distributed. The drone is assumed to be placed in a
specific location above the area with a varying altitude below 60m to ensure the
coverage of all ground nodes within the area.

6.4.3

Metrics and Baselines

To assess the performance, we considered the total authentication time, which
includes all the communication and computation delays. In addition, we considered the energy metric for drones, which indicates the energy consumption for
running the proposed approaches. To this end, we mainly counted the number
of messages sent (TX) and received (RX) by all drones as computation energy
is almost negligible compared to communication energy costs. To compare with
our proposed approach, we considered some baselines as follows:
1. Drone-to-Drone mutual authentication: For this case, we considered a baseline
approach where all the newcomer drones are authenticated to the CC through
the observer drone using multi-hop/ long-distance communication. This communication to the CC is based on a challenge-response mechanism referred to as
centralized authentication. As a second baseline, we also considered our proxy
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approach but in a sequential manner where drones authenticate themselves in
a sequence starting from the observer drone’s first neighbor using unicast messages. This approach is referred to as sequential proxy signature in the figures,
while our approach is shown as parallel proxy signature.
2. Drone-to-ground node authentication: For this case, as a baseline, we considered a pairwise proxy authentication from a drone to each of the ground nodes
using unicast messaging. We refer to this approach as unicast-based proxy signature in the figures. Moreover, we consider a traditional group authentication
through the CC where the drone asks the observer drone to request a signed
message from CC. The CC sends it back to the drone via the observer, which
can then broadcast it to the cluster’s ground nodes. This baseline is referred to
as centralized group authentication in the figures. Our approach is labeled as
broadcast-based proxy signature.

6.4.4

Performance Results

Drone-to-Drone Mutual Authentication results
Fig. 6.4 shows the authentication time plotted with the increasing number of
drones for all approaches. As can be seen, our parallel proxy scheme can provide
significant time savings compared to a centralized challenge-response approach
and sequential proxy. With the increased number of drones, the reduction is
almost doubled. This reduction can be attributed to the fact that our approach
performs authentications in parallel, thanks to consent from CC, which reduces
the authentication time.
Table 6.2 shows the total number of messages sent and received for each approach. As can be seen, proxy-based approaches are much more energy-efficient.
The parallel proxy approach reduces the transmission messages, TX more than
13 fold when the # of drones is 11 compared to the centralized approach. Again
this is due to eliminating the need to reach observer drone or CC for any authentication purposes. Moreover, the parallel proxy approach results in more received
messages, RX, more than the sequential proxy signature as we broadcast the messages, and more nodes can receive it. However, as TX energy cost is typically
much higher than RX, the parallel proxy approach is still more energy efficient
as it almost halves the TX count.
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Fig. 6.4 Drone-to-Drone mutual authentication time under varying # of drones.

Table 6.2 Total # of messages for drone-to-drone authentication.
Centralized
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Sequential
Proxy Signature
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Drone-to-Ground Authentication Results
In this subsection, we present the performance of the authentication mechanism
for Drone-to-Ground authentication. We assessed the effect of a different number
of ground nodes on the drone-to-ground node authentication time. As seen in
Fig. 6.5, the time for Unicast-based Proxy Signature increases linearly with the
increasing number of ground nodes since, in this mechanism, the drone authenticates to each ground node separately. However, for our broadcast-based proxy
signature approach, the authentication time stays stable even though the number
of ground nodes increases. This stability is because we use a broadcast-based
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Fig. 6.5 Drone-to-Ground authentication time under varying # of ground nodes

approach where each ground node can become part of one of the existing clusters
served by a drone. Increasing the number of nodes will only increase a cluster’s
size, yet the broadcast will still reach them in one message. Note that compared
to these proxy cases, the centralized group authentication performs much worse
due to the need for long-distance communication to the CC. Nonetheless, since
each drone uses broadcasts, the authentication time is fixed.
Looking at the total number of messages exchanged, as seen in Table 6.3, our
approach requires a single transmission message from each drone. At the same
time, this will increase with the number of ground nodes in the unicast-based
authentication. Moreover, a drone in centralized group authentication needs to
reach the observer and the CC, which increases the TX count. Given that RX
count is similar for all approaches, our broadcast-based proxy approach consumes
the least energy.
Table 6.3 Total # of messages for drone-to-ground authentication.
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CHAPTER 7
DRONE AUTHENTICATION TO THE 5G NETWORKS
The 5G infrastructure with both UEs and the various IoT devices will pose
threats to the 5G network infrastructure and expose users’ privacy. Recognizing
this risk, the current 5G also comes with new security protocols to ensure primary
security services for confidentiality, integrity, and authentication [SH15, JM19].
Nevertheless, the current focus of these security services is primarily about users
and their data. While there are defined procedures for M2M communication
security, their assurance will not be verified until large-scale M2M applications
with 5G are deployed. Hence, there is a need for additional security services for
drone applications that will utilize separate network slices in 5G.
Therefore, in this chapter, we propose a second-factor authentication scheme
to verify legal drones’ authenticity as a part of the 5G network. This second-factor
authentication is inspired by multi-factor authentication mechanisms currently
employed in IT systems for enhanced security. The goal is to double-check a
drone’s authenticity by utilizing various factors from the primary authentication
that comes with 5G authentication services. Unlike second-factor systems where
the entire authentication depends on both first and second factors, the proposed
mechanism will be in addition to the primary one. The main challenges for such
an authentication scheme are twofold: 1) To provide a lightweight scheme that
will not bring additional burden to drones, and 2) integrate the mechanisms to
the current 5G standard based on 3GPP specifications [SH15].
To this end, for the first challenge, we propose a challenge-response based
protocol that conforms with the current 5G authentication standard that utilizes drones’ digital IDs, which will be enforced by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the US [Fed20]. We include mechanisms such as simultaneously using a seed and nonce to prevent any replay attacks. We exploit the
re-authentication triggering mechanism currently in place for the 5G authentication for the second challenge. This trigger is used to initiate our second-factor
authentication without making any other system changes. We implemented the
proposed approach in the NS-3 simulation environment, which supports 5G radio access. The evaluation indicated that the proposed approach brings almost
negligible overhead in both computation and communication and can be easily
integrated with network slicing.
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This chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.1 is dedicated to the system
models. In Section 7.2, we explain the details of our proposed authentication
approach. is dedicated to of the approach. Finally, the security evaluation and
authentication performance evaluation are in Section 7.4 and Section 7.3, respectively.

7.1
7.1.1

System and Attack Models
System Model

Fig. 7.1 Assumed network slicing for drones.
We assume a 5G cellular infrastructure where drones could connect through
the standard 5G Authentication procedure (EAP-AKA or EAP-TLS). Each drone
is considered to have a digital ID assigned by FAA. This digital ID assignment is
due to a recent announcement from FAA in the US that each drone accessing the
5G system shall be assigned a drone Remote Identifier (Remote ID) to register
drones [Fed20] legally. Moreover, all drones are initially registered as UE devices
through the SEAF/AMF in the network core for proper cellular communication.
Hence, the primary 5G authentication protocols are executed for all the drones
before any communication attempts throughout the network.
In 5G, the service model is based on virtual network slices [LSC+ 17], allowing
flexibility for providing differentiated services based on applications’ needs and
requirements. A virtual network slice is a network customized to serve a defined
business purpose or customer, consisting of an end-to-end composition of all the
available network resources required to satisfy the specific performance [LSC+ 17].
These virtual network slices are the major re-haul from 4G/LTE systems and
enable flexibility and efficiency. Each network slice is identified by a Single Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (S-NSSAI), which could be used by
a UE when requesting access to the 5G Core and the 5G-Radio Access Network (5G-RAN) [3GP20]. In our case, we assume that there is a specific network
slice for the drones to provide additional authentication services as shown in Fig.
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7.1 managed by the third party mentioned above. This slice information is provided by the drone when connecting to the 5G network core.

7.1.2

Attack Model

We assume that the 5G Core network is trusted, but the drones are not trusted,
and they can try to bypass the system to become part of the 5G network. We
identify any malicious drone as a drone that is not pre-registered in a friendly
drone database administered by a third party and is trying to access the network
to communicate with other parties. We also assume that adversaries may impersonate a drone or core network to replay authentication messages back and
forth.

7.2

Slice Specific Second-Factor Authentication

When a drone acting as a UE requests connectivity through a specific slice in 5G,
the slice manager may also want to further authenticate the device for increased
security in addition to 5G primary authentication. Note that this is somewhat
analogous to the second-factor (or multi-factor) authentication concept used in
modern IT systems. However, it is in addition to primary one (i.e., primary and
secondary are not linked), which is not the case in IT systems. In a sense, it
can be considered as a re-authentication mechanism for more specific purposes.
Nevertheless, there needs to be diversity in this additional authentication request,
as in the case of second-factor authentication. The goal is to increase security by
using a different factor each time (e.g., asking for a text message after entering
your password). To support this concept in our case, we would like to request
information from the drones in this second authentication that is different from
the primary authentication (e.g., ID, keys, fingerprints, etc.) while still following the EAP-based authentication used in the 3GPP standard. However, as the
current 3GPP specifications do not explicitly support this type of second-factor
authentication [3GP20], we propose utilizing specific existing 3GPP procedures
to integrate our second-factor authentication protocol to the current standard.
Next, we explain how we can trigger this second-factorby following the standard’s specifications (i.e., not requesting any changes), and then we describe our
authentication protocol in detail.
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7.2.1

Initiating Slice Specific Second-Factor Authentication

Current 3GPP standard specifications allow a re-authentication procedure for a
device based on its S-NSSAI [3GP20]. Specifically, suppose there is a specific
S-NSSAI for drones other than the default one. In that case, this specific drone
slice could dictate the Authentication Authorization and Access Server (AAA-S)
to initiate another application-specific authentication. Note that AAA-S is in
charge of authentication in 5G and maybe sitting in the operator’s network or a
separate third party network. This procedure is called AAA-S triggered Network
Slice-Specific Re-authentication and Re-authorization procedure [3GP20] and its
details are shown in Fig. 7.2. We adopt this procedure for our initiation purposes
so that our approach can be easily integrated with the envisioned implementations
of 5G Core.

Fig. 7.2 AAA-S triggered Network Slice-Specific Re-authentication and Reauthorization procedure in 3GPP. We use this procedure to integrate our secondfactor into the system.
In our approach, before AAA-S initiates the second-factor authentication, the
slice functions will need to check whether the SUPI of the device registered exists in a drone database created in advance. If the SUPI of the registered drone
is within this database, then a second-factor will be mandated. That is precisely where our approach kicks in: We exploit the 5G standard’s ability to reauthenticate to trigger a mandatory second-factor authentication for drones to
secure their communication further. This approach will be initiated by AAAS, which requests Generic Public Subscription Identifier (GPSI) for the devices.
Note that GPSI is used for addressing a 3GPP subscription in different data networks outside of the 3GPP system. But since the 3GPP system stores within
the subscription data the association between the GPSI and the corresponding
SUPI, it is easy to map. The initiation process follows the procedure in 3GPP
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Fig. 7.3 second-factorauthentication registration shown in black messages and
proposed protocol shown in blue messages
standards, where AAA-S informs the AMF to request registration from the drone.
AMF will initiate a challenge-response EAP protocol to the newly authenticated
drone that will follow our proposal to differentiate it from the primary one. This
EAP-compliant procedure is explained in the next subsection.
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7.2.2

Second-factor authentication protocol

Our protocol follows a challenge-response type authentication procedure since it
needs to conform with the current EAP framework for 5G authentication. This
framework is flexible because it allows replacing the underlying authentication
protocol such as AKA or TLS. Our approach’s main motivation is to enable a
more restricted authentication specific to our application that will rely on different
information from the primary 5G authentication. To this end, we utilize two new
items that have no relationship with the prior material generated during primary
authentication: 1) The digital ID of the drone: As mentioned before, this unique
ID will be different than any other IDs that the 5G system might assign; and 2) A
new symmetric key different from the existing key hierarchy: This key is produced
from a unique seed generated by the machine managing the related network slice
function so that it will not have any relation with the key seed KSEAF produced
during the primary authentication.
Our challenge-response protocol kicks in after AMF (i.e., the party responsible
for handling the process after AAA-S informs it about the second authentication
request) follows the drone’s standard registration procedure. It sends an EAP ID
request message and gets an EAP Response from the drone, passed to AUSF and
AAA-S as part of the initiation procedures. This process is shown in Fig. 7.3
in black messages. The rest of the authentication process between the AAA-S
and the drone, shown in blue in Fig. 7.3, is detailed below. Note that we could
directly initiate the authentication from the AAA-S without resorting to EAPRequest and Response messages. Since this is part of the initiation process, we
follow the standard’s messages to ensure that our protocol can be fully integrated.

• Challenge from AAA-S: The AAS-S prepares a challenge to be relayed to
the drone by the intermediate components AUSF/UDM and AMF/SEAF. This
includes a random number R and a seed Seed generated by the hosting computer using pseudo-random generator each time there is a need for a secondary
authentication. The Seed is encrypted using the symmetric key, KSEAF which
was produced in the primary authentication phase and then sent to drone DID
along with R. Moreover, ID is the FAA remote identifier assigned to the drone:

AAA − S → EKSEAF (Seed), R
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(7.1)

• Challenge Response Preparation: The receiving drone, DID calculates the
challenge reply based on a unique symmetric key T which is created by using
private ID, Seed and R sent to it:
T = F (Seed, ID, R)

(7.2)

where F is a deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) function [BFW15].
The drone then uses this T as a symmetric key and m as a dummy message and
creates a secure message authentication code (HMAC) [KF07]. This HMAC
and m are then relayed to the AAA-S as follows: The drone then uses this T
and creates a secureHMAC [KF07] message using T as a symmetric key and m
as a dummy message.
HM AC(T |m), m → AAA − S

(7.3)

• Response Verification: AAA-S receives these HM AC(T |m) and m pair and
recomputes a new HMAC by using the info stored locally in the database (i.e.,
drone ID, Seed and R to re-generate T ). If the new HMAC and the received
one matches, then it sends an ACK message to the drone to finish the secondfactor authentication:
ACK → Drone

(7.4)

If they do not match, then a de-registration procedure is initiated. The AAA-S
contacts AMF to initiate this process for the UE, which is already part of the
3GPP standard.

7.2.3

Security Analysis of the Proposed Protocol

Our second-factor authentication utilizes unique information from drones and
AAA-S. Therefore, any drone whose unique ID is not in the database will be
de-registered from the network when our second-factor is triggered. The protocol
is also resilient against any replay or integrity attacks. Any adversary that tries
to create an HMAC will fail due to lack of access to the secret key T . In addition,
each time, the AAA-S will generate a new seed Seed, so any replay attack from
an imposter server will fail due to mismatching of Seed values. Similarly, since
the drone is using a new R each time, any replay attack from the drone side will
also not be possible. These values ensure that authentication messages are all
fresh. Finally, even if a drone ID is compromised, this can not be used in future
authentications because the system requires new Seed and R values (i.e., forward
secrecy).
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7.3

Security Analysis

The security analysis, the proposed authentication model is qualified to sustain
the following security issues,
1. Message Integrity: Any adversary that tries to create an HMAC will fail
due to lack of access to the secret key T . Hence, integrity is achieved.
2. Strongness: During the verification process, the encrypted KS EAF secret
key and DID needed. Thus, any entity other than the designated drone
is incapable of successfully complete the validation. Hence, the proposed
scheme is strong enough against the resilience of various types of attacks.
3. Modification attack : The warrant comprises the message scope, and verification needs the secret key of the core network. Thus, during verification,
message alteration will not be successful. Thus, the proposed scheme prevents modification attacks.
4. Replay Attack : Each time, the AAA-S will generate a new seed Seed, so
any replay attack from an imposter server will fail due to mismatching of
Seed values. Similarly, since the drone is using a new R each time, any
replay attack from the drone side will also not be possible. These values
ensure that authentication messages are all fresh. Finally, even if a drone
ID is compromised, this can not be used in future authentications because
the system requires new Seed and R values (i.e., forward secrecy). Thus, a
replay attack is not successful in the proposed scheme.
5. MiTM attack: To prevent MiTM attack, authentication of source, identifiability, and unforgeability should be satisfied. Since the proposed authentication scheme satisfies all these attacks as aforementioned, therefore, an
eavesdropper can not alter the message signature pair. Hence, the proposed
scheme prevents the MiTM attack.
Furthermore, the Seed and R values ensure that authentication messages are
all fresh. Hence, even if a drone ID is compromised, this can not be used in
future authentications because the system requires new Seed and R values (i.e.,
forward secrecy).
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7.4
7.4.1

Performance Analysis
Experiment Setup

In order to assess the performance of the proposed second-factor authentication,
we utilized the NS-3 network simulator, which has recently implemented 5G-RAN
module [WoP18]. Nevertheless, it still does not support the new 5G Core, and
thus we needed to simulate the slicing on the server-side. Specifically, we created
a UE node (node 1) to represent a drone and another server node (node 2) to
define the core network’s AUSF server, all of which serve as NS-3 nodes. This
AUSF is connected to another server (node 3), representing the AAA-S and specific network slice for drones. We created an Ethernet connection from the AUSF
server to AAA-S to indicate connections between them, assuming AAA-S can represent a virtual function. The overall architecture for this implementation setup
is shown in Fig. 7.4. In this implementation, we initiate the process by sending

Fig. 7.4 NS-3 implementation setup.

a message from UE to AUSF assuming this will be the completion of primary
authentication, which then contacts AAA-S through the Ethernet connection for
slice specific authentication. Our implementation starts with AAA-S contacting
core network (i.e., AMF) to contact the UE which will start running messaging
shown in Fig. 6.1. Table 7.1 lists the system parameters for NS-3 simulation as
well as the bit sizes for keys used in the experiments.

7.4.2

Metrics and Baselines

To assess our proposed authentication mechanism’s overhead, we considered the
total authentication time, which includes all the communication and computation
delays during the authentication process. Note that the computational delay is
crucial in determining the proposed authentication scheme’s overhead due to lim-
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Table 7.1 Simulation Parameters
Parameter

Value

Packet size

1000 bit

Data rate

30 Mb/sec

Background nodes traffic

10

gNodeB distance

300 m

inter packet interval

100

Seed size

440 bits

Remote ID size

32 bit

KSEAF size

256 bit

HMAC type

SHA256

ited battery and resources on a drone. Hence, toward a more realistic assessment,
we used a Raspberry-Pi3 IoT device to mimic the drone’s behavior.

7.4.3

Performance Results

Drone Computational Overhead
The drone’s computational delays through the second-factor authentication are
in Table 7.2. Hence, the total processing delay for our proposed secondary authentication is 0.942msec. Moreover, the utilization of the DRBG hash provides
a faster computational time, and hence, the total computational time is less than
1msec, which is even less than the total time for primary 5G-AKA authentication.

Table 7.2 Computational Overhead Comoarison
Approach

Operation

Delay (msec)

2nd Factor

DRBG-Hash

0.16

2nd Factor

HMAC

0.78

2nd Factor

Total

0.94

5G-AKA

Total

1.02
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Communication Delay
The communication delays experienced between the AAA-S and the drone throughout the second-factor authentication are in Table 7.3. As seen, the total authentication delay is 7msec for one drone authentication. Note that since our approach
also uses challenge-response based authentication, the communication delay is
almost similar due to the same number of messages exchanged for primary authentication. The only additional delay for our approach is the triggering time,
which is 3.62msec in total. Overall, the total time of 7msec is an important figure
since this is the amount of time provided to drone to act maliciously until the
second-factor authentication de-registers it if the drone is malicious. During that
7msec, the drone can’t collect and transmit any meaningful data, which indicates
our approach’s effectiveness.

Table 7.3 Second-Factor Communication Overhead
Approach

Connection

Delay(msec)

2nd Factor

AUSF to AAA-S Ethernet

1.50

2nd Factor

Drone to AUSF

1.12

2nd Factor

TCP Handshake Time

2.18

2nd Factor

Total Communication Delay

7.00

5G-AKA

Total Communication Delay

3.38

Impact of Background Traffic Delay
Another factor we investigated is the impact of background traffic from other
existing nodes within the same cell during the second-factor authentication. We
simulated both Uplink and Downlink background traffic connecting to the AUSF
server simultaneously while starting the second-factor authentication to investigate this point further. The traffic frequency at each node is set to 1msec interval
between packets transmissions, and the maximum number of packets sent by each
node is set to 100000. This setup is considered a heavy bulk background traffic
over the server. As shown in Table 7.4, the total authentication delay based on
the high background traffic up to 100 nodes is within 0.4 µsec. Hence, under
heavy background traffic, the additional delay is negligible, which means no extra
delay overhead on the proposed authentication.
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Table 7.4 Delay under varying Background Traffic
Background Nodes

Delay (msec)

10

7.000753

50

7.000810

100

7.000968
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CHAPTER 8
DRONE TO DRONE AUTHENTICATION IN THE 5G
NETWORKS

8.1

Introduction

The 5G ProSe security extension scheme is still under development, which opens
a wide area for research and contributing. This chapter proposes an authentication scheme that fits in the 5G D2D ProSe anticipated standard. We propose a
delegation based authentication for lightweight, fast and reliable authentication
instead of the existing LTE/5G ProSe centralized scheme. In particular, we propose a proxy signature algorithm where each legal drone will assign a delegation
warrant and parameters to derive the proxy signature keys to be used in the authentication process. Moreover, the proxy signature keys take into calculations
the drone’s private key, and hence, we prevent malicious drones and repudiation
attacks. We follow the ProSe discovery model for the drone discovery phase, in
which the drone detects other drones in the network for D2D communication. The
ProSe discovery model has two models, Model A and Model B. In Model A, each
drone announces its existence in the network, wherein in Model B, each drone
sends a discovery message to the nearest drones. Our proposed authentication
protocol would work for both Models. We follow Model A in our simulations;
however, Model B applies to our proposed model as well. We assume a leader
drone as a relay between the 5G core network and all other drone swarms. We
propose a proxy signature-based message exchange mechanism between the leader
drone and the swarm drones.
In this chapter, We target the security challenges in the drones’ D2D communication in such a way that conjunct into the 5G D2D ProSe standards. We
assume having a swarm-of-drones where only one of them is within the cellular
coverage (i.e., a data relay) and others establish D2D links with this leader drone.
The leader drone acts as a UE-to-Network Relay between the 5G network core
and all other drones in the swarm. We propose mutual authentication of leader
drone and others in the swarm. Given the resource limitations of drones, we must
provide an efficient and lightweight solution for scalability purposes.
As opposed to following an approach similar to the 4G ProSe security standards where there is a requirement to have access to the network core, we opt
for a solution that will minimize the message exchanges among the drones and
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the core network. To achieve the above objectives, we propose a delegation-based
authentication using proxy signatures. A proxy signature enables a party to delegate its authentication credentials to other parties while still providing the same
security services as digital signatures (i.e., source authentication and message integrity). Specifically, the proxy signer signs a message using a secret key of the
original signer and its own private key [DSP06, LY05]. Our solution is similar to
the existing OpenID [RR06] type authentication mechanisms. In the sense that
they rely on an OpenID server, which issues identities to be presented as evidence (i.e., like a proxy signature) for authentication. However, we do not want
to access this server each time, in our case, since we would like to minimize the
number of messages.
Therefore, after the mandatory 5G registration phase, we add a delegation
phase, in which we assign a delegation warrant and proxy parameters. Those
delegation parameters are used to derive the proxy signature keys for the authentication process. Then, we follow the existing ProSe device discovery model
where a drone detects other drones in the network for D2D communication. The
ProSe discovery model has two options: Model A and Model B. In Model A, a
drone announces its existence in the network, wherein in Model B, each drone
sends a discovery message to the nearest drones. Our proposed authentication
protocol would work for both models. The authentication process is integrated
into the discovery phase by attaching a drone’s proxy signature and verifying it
by the receiving drones. We assessed our scheme through implementation with
the NS-3 5G network simulator under the D2D communication model [Dio17].
For a realistic assessment of computations times for the proxy signature keys,
we performed all the computations on a Raspberry-Pi3 IoT device. We also set
a baseline comparison to the 4G ProSe security standard. Our results show an
overall much lower device authentication delay compared to this baseline.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The system and attack models
are described in Section 4.2. The proposed authentication schemes are introduced
in Section 8.3. Finally, the security analysis and performance evaluation are in
Section 8.4 and Section 6.4, respectively.
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8.2

System and Attack Models

8.2.1

System Model

We assume a drone-to-drone communication model under a 5G cellular infrastructure network. The drones can communicate directly through D2D communication. One of the drones, leader drone, will act as a UE-to-Network relay to the
5G core network. The described communication model for the proposed 5G D2D
drone communication is in Fig. 8.1. Each drone i is assumed to have a pair of
public and private asymmetric keys: yi and xi respectively.

D2D Link

Cellular Link

Leader Drone

D2D Link

D2D Link

Drone Swarm
gNodeB
Fig. 8.1 Assumed drone communication model.

8.2.2

Attack Model

We assume the following threats to the drones:
1. Malicious Leader Drone: A malicious drone can broadcast messages to other
drones claiming to be a UE-network relay for them. In such cases, private
data is collected from the drones.
2. Replay Attack : A malicious drone sniffs the communication between other
legitimate drones to maliciously transmit a repeated or delayed signature
to verify itself to the leader drone.

8.3
8.3.1

D2D Authentication Protocol
Motivation and Overview

As described under the ProSe security standard, the authentication solution is
time-consuming and introduces additional message overhead. The ProSe security
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Proxy Signature Broadcast
D1 Proxy Signature Message

D1

D2 Proxy Signature Message

Leader Drone

D2

Di Proxy Signature Message

Di

Drone Swarm
Fig. 8.2 Drones authentication messages.
standard further requires maintaining the state information about all the keys.
As a result, following a similar approach will not be useful to IoT devices, which
require a fast and scalable authentication mechanism. Therefore, in this chapter,
we propose a new model for the 5G standard, with no pre-messaging to sustain
IoT devices that may be resource-constrained, such as drones.
In this way, we also minimize the message count to ensure scalability for the
5G Core and support an increased number of nodes.
Specifically, we propose a proxy signature-based device authentication where
the leader drone first authenticates itself to the swarm of drones by only broadcasting a proxy signature. Hence, other drones in the swarm initiate the authentication to this leader drone by using a similar proxy signature to be ready for
communication, as shown in Fig. 8.2. In both cases, the original signer of these
proxy signatures is the 5G Core (i.e., the elements that will replace PKMF in 4G).
Therefore, we allow the nodes to authenticate themselves to the PKMF existing
within 4G through the leader drone. We provide the details of this process in the
next subsections.

8.3.2

Registration and Delegation Phase

After the drones are registered and authenticated through 5G authentication services (i.e., 5G-AKA [Kou19] mechanism), they are checked against their digital
drone IDs to initiate a delegation phase for D2D communication. A specific slice
function is triggered based on the drone IDs kept in a list by the network function
operator. In the delegation phase, all these drones receive the needed parameters
for the proxy signature creation. Those parameters are fetched specifically from
the AAA-S in the 5G core network, as shown in Fig. 8.3.
Let us assume that AAA-S has a private-public key pair (xc , yc ). The proxy
signature keys are created for a drone Di by first generating a random number
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Proxy Signature Broadcast
(tl ,σl , wl ,ypl, yl)
Verify Proxy
Signature

Relay Discovery

2.) Swarm Drone
Authentication Phase

Proxy Signature Unicast
(ti ,σi , wi ,ypi, yi)

Verify Proxy
Signature

Fig. 8.3 Proxy Signature exchange messages within 5G Core and the involved
drones.

as a seed for the proxy signature parameters. The details of this process are as
follows:
• Let g be a generator of a multiplicative subgroup of Zp∗ with order p. Then
a random number ki ∈R Zp∗ is selected from this set.
• The proxy signature parameters are generated as follows:
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ri = g ki ,

(8.1)

si = xc h(wi , ri ) + ki ,
where, h() is a collision resistant hash function. In addition, as part of this
proxy signature, the AAA-S creates a unique warrant wi for each drone Di ,
as follows:
wi = S(ri , si ),

(8.2)

where S() is any digital signature function. Note that this warrant is specific
to drone Di as it uses the (ri , si ).
• Then, the delegation parameters (i.e., the proxy parameters, the warrant,
and the core network public key) are sent securely to the drone Di as a tuple
of (wi , ri , si , yc ). We use the KSEAF key produced during the 5G primary
authentication for this encrypted communication.
• The leader drone Dl that will act as a UE-to-Network relay receives a similar
uniquely created tuple of (wl , rl , sl , yc ).

8.3.3

Discovery and Device Authentication Phase

The next phase after the registration and delegation phases is the discovery phase,
where the drones can search for the other available UE-to-Network relay drones
for D2D connection. This phase is done through the ProSe standard in the cellular
network. The second part of Fig. 8.3 shows the 5G ProSe D2D discovery process.
The ProSe standard has two models of discovery: Model A and Model B. In Model
A, the UE-network relay announces its presence, while in Model B, the UE/drone
sends a discovery message to the nearest nodes. Our proposed authentication
protocol would work for both models. In discovery messages for both models,
each drone (leader or not) attaches the proxy signature. Anyone who replies will
attach its proxy signature as well. We explain this protocol in two parts below:
Leader Drone Authentication
The leader drone message exchange for the proposed proxy signature authentication protocol is shown in Fig. 8.3 under the leader drone authentication phase.
• The leader drone Dl creates the proxy signature keys, (xpl , ypl ), using the
delegation parameters as follows:
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xpl = sl + h(wl , rl )xl
h(wl ,rl )

ypl = (yc yl )

(8.3)

rl

• The leader drone then creates the following signature:
(8.4)

σl = S(tl , xpl ).

where tl is a timestamp nonce using its private key xpl . Note that since xpl
is only known by Dl , the proxy signature can be only created by a legitimate
Dl .
• The leader drone Dl broadcasts this proxy signature (blue doted message
in Fig. 8.3) that contains the following tuple:
(tl , σl , wl , ypl , yl )
• Then, each drone Di in the swarm receives the proxy signature and verifies
the leader’s proxy signature as follows:
?

V(tl , σl , (yc yl )h(wl ,yl ) ypi ) = T rue,

(8.5)

where V() is a digital signature verification algorithm.
Swarm Drones Proxy Signature-based Authentication
Next, in response to the leader’s broadcast signature, the swarm drones send a
reply to be authenticated to the leader drone. The swarm drones authentication
to the leader drone is shown in Fig. 8.3 under the swarm drone authentication
phase.
• Initially, each drone Di creates the proxy signature keys, (xpi , ypi ), using
the delegation parameters as follows:

xpi = si + h(wi , ri )xi ,
h(wi ,ri )

ypi = (yc yi )

(8.6)

ri .

• Next, each drone prepares a signed nonce with its proxy private key, xpi as
follows:

σi = S(ti , xpi ).
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(8.7)

• Next, after receiving the leaders broadcast message, the drone Di then sends
the proxy signature message that contains the following tuple: (ti , σi , wi , ypi , yi )
in its reply.
• Then, the leader drone Dl verifies this proxy signature, as follows:
?

V(ti , σi , (yc yi )h(wi ,yi ) ypi ) = T rue,

(8.8)

where V() is a digital signature verification algorithm.
Since both the leader drone and the drones in the swarm are already mutually
authenticated, they can start message communication securely. The leader drone
can create a symmetric key and send it to the other drones using its private key, to
be used for message encryption, authentication, and integrity. We do not discuss
these details as message authentication is beyond our scope.

8.3.4

Proxy key Revocation

Whenever asymmetric keys are used, there is a need for a key revocation mechanism if they are compromised. Revocation is the declaration for the existing
proxy signature keys as obsolete (i.e., not valid anymore). We propose that the
AAA-S in the core network can revoke yp , which is the public proxy signature of a
proxy drone B. Simultaneously as the leader drone verifying the proxy signature
of B using its public proxy key yp , it will also check whether this key is in a
proxy revocation list. This revocation process is similar to the case of certificate
revocation lists (CRLs) [MAM+ 99] in usual public-key systems.

8.4

Security Analysis

The security analysis, the proposed authentication model is qualified to sustain
the following security issues,
1. Authentication of source: During the delegation phase, the drones are assigned with the network core (original signer) warrant and delegation parameter. Therefore, during the drone authentication stage, the verifier drone
can verify the delegation source. Thus, the proposed scheme proves the
authentication of the source.
2. Identifiable: The construction of the proposed authentication scheme is
warrant and private key-based. Therefore, any drone can identify both the
original signer and the proxy signer. Thus, identifiability is satisfied.
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3. Message Integrity: The authentication message alteration can result in a
rejected authentication in the verification stage in Eq. (8.8) and Eq. (8.5).
A malicious drone Dm needs to send a proxy signature message that can
be verified using the Dm ’s proxy public key. However, since the delegation
phase is held securely before the drones’ release to its location, Dm will
fail to create its pair of the proxy keys since it does not have the unique
delegation parameters. Hence, integrity is achieved.
4. Prevention of misuse: The scope of message is only comprised in the warrant, and therefore, the drone (proxy signer) can not sign an illegal document. Our proposed D2D drone authentication utilizes information distributed by the core network itself through delegation. Hence, to join the
network, a legitimate drone Di needs to show its valid and unique pair of
proxy keys along with the warrant. The proxy keys are created based on the
unique delegation parameters, ri and si , given by the SEAF/AMF serving
network to the drone Di . Thus, the proposed scheme prevents the misuse
of proxy signing.
5. Strongness: During the verification process, the verifier’s secret key is needed.
Thus, any entity other than the designated verifier (drone) is incapable of
verifying the message signature pair’s validity. Hence, the proposed scheme
is strong enough against the resilience of various types of attacks.
6. Modification attack : The warrant comprises the message scope, and verification needs the secret key of the core network. Thus, during verification,
message alteration will not be successful. Thus, the proposed scheme prevents modification attacks.
7. Replay Attack : The protocol is also resilient against any replay or integrity
attacks. Any adversary Dm that tries to impersonate a legitimate drone in
the swarm Di by performing a replay attack where it replays a captured
message from Di either for joining the network or claiming to be the leader
drone. In both cases, Dm broadcasts the whole proxy signature of drone
Di , (ti , σi , wi , ypi , yi ). Let us assume a verifier node receives this broadcast
for the first time. This proxy signature will not pass the verification using
Eq. (8.8) due to stale timestamp value in the message. Similarly, for replay
attack of the leader drone broadcast message, the signature will not pass
the verification at Eq.(8.5) in the same manner. Thus, a replay attack is
not successful in the proposed scheme.
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8. Impersonation attack : Due to the correctness of verification and that it
is based on several parameters from both the signer drone (proxy signer)
and the core network (original signer), the impersonation attack can not be
successful.
9. MiTM attack: To prevent MiTM attack, authentication of source, identifiability, and unforgeability should be satisfied. Since the proposed authentication scheme satisfies all these attacks as aforementioned, therefore, an
eavesdropper can not alter the message signature pair. Hence, the proposed
scheme prevents the MiTM attack.

8.5
8.5.1

Performance Analysis
Experiment Setup

We simulated the proposed approach using the NS-3 5G network simulator, which
has recently implemented 5G RAN module [WoP18]. We also utilized the D2D
implementation in [Dio17] for a node to node communication between drones. We
created 2 UE nodes representing the leader drone and one swarm drone, respectively. For our experiment, we added a server node representing the AAA-S for
the proxy authentication computation. We selected Model A, where the leader
announces itself first, then the others join. We also assume that the proxy signature parameters are pre-installed to the nodes. The system parameters for
the NS-3 simulation used in the experiments are listed in Table 8.1. We further
used a Raspberry-Pi3 IoT device to mimic the drone’s behavior for complexity
convenience and realistic assessment.

8.5.2

Metrics and Baselines

To assess the proposed authentication mechanism overhead, we consider the total authentication time, which includes all the communication and computation
delays during the authentication process.
Moreover, as a baseline comparison to our proposed D2D authentication mechanism, we use the 4G ProSe D2D security as a centralized authentication model.
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Table 8.1 Simulation Parameters

8.5.3

Parameter

Value

Packet size

56 Byte

Data rate

30 Mb/sec

gNodeB distance

300 m

drone to drone distance

150 m

KSEAF size

256 bit

Proxy Signature Hash Function

SipHash [AB12]

Performance Results

Drone Computational Overhead
The drones computational delay experienced through the proxy signature authentication are listed in Table 8.2. As seen, the total processing delay for our proposed
drone D2D authentication is 2.012 msec, which includes all the proxy signature
parameters and keys calculations. These results indicate that the computational
complexity is almost negligible.
Table 8.2 Computational Overhead
Operation

Delay (msec)

SipHash Function

0.13

Proxy Private Key Creation xpi &xpl

1.02

Proxy Public Key Creation ypi & ypl

0.992

Total

2.012

Communication Delay
The communication delays experienced between the drones are listed in Table 8.3.
The total delay for the proposed proxy signature authentication communication
delay is 6.35 msec. Hence, the total delay for the proposed authentication mechanism after adding the computation delay is 8.362 msec. In comparison, the ProSe
mechanism with a total authentication time of 12.46 msec, while our proposed
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authentication mechanism is almost 33% faster. The reason for this delay is due
to the 4G-based ProSe connection to the core network.
Table 8.3 Communication Overhead
Approach

Connection

Delay(msec)

Proxy Signature

Discovery Phase

2.32

Proxy Signature

D2D Message Exchange

4.03

Proxy Signature

Total Communication Delay

6.35

4G-based ProSe

Total Communication Delay

12.46

Impact of Background Traffic Delay
We further investigate the impact of background traffic from other existing communication to the leader drone during the D2D drone authentication. We simulated an uplink and downlink background traffic over the leader drone simultaneously while starting the D2D proxy authentication. The traffic frequency at
each background node is set to 1 msec intervals between packet transmissions. As
shown in Table 8.4, the total authentication communication delay based on the
background traffic up to 40 nodes is within 0.8 µsec. Hence, under background
traffic, the additional delay is negligible, which means no extra delay overhead on
the proposed authentication.
Table 8.4 Authentication Delay under varying Background Traffic
Background Nodes

Delay (msec)

1

6.350012

10

6.350064

20

6.350207

40

6.35089
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

9.1

Conclusions

This dissertation utilized a swarm of drones to have a more connected, reliable,
and secure communication over the next generation mmWave frequencies for a
higher data rate transmission. We targeted next-generation communication in
both the 5G cellular and Ad hoc IEEE 802.11ad/ay networks. We further considered a typical communication situations as well as post-disaster circumstances,
where drones are temporarily positioned within an affected area to create a wireless mesh network among public safety personnel. We started with restoring and
enhancing the network connectivity to avoid isolated node scenarios and reduce
network congestion resulting from mmWave channel statistics. We incorporated
positioning a swarm of UAVs to increase the network connectivity and address
the mmWave short communication range. Jointly, we considered the UAVs’ interference management to avoid power loss due to communication overlapping while
taking into account UAVs’ limited resources, such as transmission power. Once
the network is well connected and ready for communication, we ensured network
reliability by optimizing the drones’ communication E2E delay through multipath
routing, which increases the redundant data through different routes.
For guaranteeing the drones’ security, we interpreted the security challenges
over the ad hoc UAV network, assuming potential imposters. We proposed a
fast, efficient, and lightweight distributed authentication mechanism for drones
that took into account the physical limitations of mmWave communication. We
adopted a delegation authentication mechanism, named proxy signature, to provide data security and user privacy while not increasing computational loads.
We further considered a post-disaster recovery for destroyed communication infrastructure, where we relied on IEEE 802.11ad/ay ad hoc network. We further
proposed a drone-to-drone proxy signature-based authentication mechanism delegated by the control center.
Toward a secure next-generation communication, we further proposed a more
robust authentication mechanism inspired by the idea of second-factor authentication in IT systems. This second-factor authentication mechanism is dedicated
to IoT devices over the 5G network, which kicks in once the primary 5G authentication is executed. The proposed trigger mechanism utilizes the re-authentication
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procedure specified in the 3GPP 5G standards for easy integration. We proposed
a reliable authentication mechanism compatible with the 5G D2D ProSe standard
mechanisms for the communication within the drones’ swarm. The proposed authentication is distributed-based authentication with a delegation-based scheme
instead of the repeated access to the 5G core network KMF.
For results insights, the considered drone positioning optimization in Chapter 4 was related to an SDP problem and solved numerically with reasonable
complexity on MATLAB CVX-SDP solver. The provided simulation results have
shown that deploying one UAV can enhance the backhaul algebraic connectivity by 80%, compared to random positioning schemes. Higher performance was
indicated for the multiple UAVs; for example, at K = 4 UAVs, 200% improvement gain in the backhaul connectivity was achieved, compared to the random
positioning scheme. The indicated connectivity enhancements are achieved while
guaranteeing the desired SINR for all the users over the mmWave access network.
In Chapter 5, we implemented the proposed multipath routing protocol and
tested it on NS-3 by relying on the MATLAB’s optimization output. The results
demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of multipath routing to achieve better throughput while minimizing the E2E delay. Moreover, the results showed that
the network connectivity enhanced by 66% after adding the UAVs. Furthermore,
the E2E delay is reduced by 50% to 66% depending on the number of nodes.
The proposed authentication mechanism in Chapter 6 was also implemented
and tested under NS-3 by utilizing mmWave channel from IEEE 802.11ad/ay
standard and relying on a Raspberry Pi’s computations. The results showed that
our proposed authentication is fast, reliable, and, more importantly, scalable to
more extensive ad hoc networks. The second-factor authentication approach in
Chapter 7 was implemented in NS-3 using the 5G mmWave radio access. The
evaluation of the approach indicated its efficiency and feasibility. We further
implemented the drones’ D2D authentication scheme in Chapter 8 using the NS3 5G D2D communication. The evaluation of the authentication model indicated
its efficiency and feasibility over the 4G Standard ProSe scheme.

9.2

Future Work

The work in this dissertation can be further investigated in the future in one or
more of the following extensions,
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• The positioning work in Chapter 4 can be extended in the future by
– Considering in-band IAB scenarios, where both the access and backhaul networks operate on the same spectrum band. Formulating the
backhaul connectivity maximization problem while considering the access network’s interference impact will be more challenging than the
considered problem formulation in this work.
– Also, considering optimal power allocation of the UAVs instead of the
equal power allocation policy is a further optimization aspect.
• The routing and positioning work in Chapter 5 can be extended as,
– The proposed model can be implemented and tested on the IEEE
802.11ay mmWave communication protocol at 60 GHz, once it is officially available on NS-3, assuming an ad hoc network.
– Models using intelligent schemes such as ML can bring new management intelligence to the optimization. ML algorithms allow the UAVs
to gain more intelligence through the learning process to update their
position and routing on-the-fly.
– Moreover, Software-defined networking (SDN) can bring new centralized techniques to manage the networking system.
• The work in Chapter 6 can be investigated as follows,
– An updating model can be considered based on UAVs’ mobility. A
model for relocating or replacing UAVs in the network, if necessary.
• The work in Chapter 7 can be implemented on a 5G core-based simulation
platform, such as the Free5GC (free5gc.org). The 5G-based NS-3 platform
is based on an LTE core network for its simulation.
• In Chapter 8, the D2D security is essential to notice that the 5G ProSe
security extensions are still under development, which opens a wide area for
research and contribution.
Furthermore, drone security challenges in the next-generation cellular networks are still open to provide on-fly lightweight schemes that will not bring additional burden to drones. This research point is highly demanding for publishing
as it still has significantly open and parching for more enhancement.
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